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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC), like many other regional 
trade agreements, has experienced anti-competitive practices in the form of cartels, 
vertical restraints, mergers and abuses of dominant positions which have adverse 
effects on trade. This paper argues that the absence of a regional competition 
regulatory framework in SADC, poses a great challenge in curbing these anti-
competitive trade practices at a regional level. The informal cooperation model 
adopted in SADC is proving too weak to competently address cross-border anti-
competitive practices due to lack of harmonised laws, constraints of the exchange 
confidential information and the voluntary and non-binding nature of cooperation, 
amongst others.  
This paper proposes that SADC should develop a regional competition regulatory 
framework so as to pool its enforcement power, capacity and resources.  A regional 
law would also benefit the region by providing legal certainty, broader jurisdiction 
and provide a formal cooperation system.  Whilst benefits of developing a regional 
competition regulatory framework are anticipated, the paper also discusses the 
prospective challenges that can hinder the legal reform in SADC.  
 
The core recommendation made is that SADC should establish a distinct substantive 
law for dealing with anticompetitive practices as they affect trade between the 
member states. In addition, a central authority should be empowered to conduct 
investigations, enforce actions and assess and levy penalties. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background  
Competition law or anti-trust law (as it is referred to in the United States (US)) was born 
in an era where competition in the market place was regarded as a national culture.1 In 
the words of Klaus Hopt: “Wettbewerb ist eine staatliche Veranstaltung” (competition is a 
state event).2 Initially, competition law was purely a domestic issue that arose in 
advanced economy countries to monitor and control competition of private enterprises 
within the domestic market.3 However, in an increasingly globalised world driven by 
comprehensive trade liberalisation, regulatory reform, technological advancements and 
rapid transportation, competition is no longer a state event.4 Trade has become more 
internationalised, domestic economies are now highly interdependent;  business 
conduct occurring in one state can (and does) have profound effects in other states.5 
Inevitably, the globalisation of the market place brings with it the risk of globalisation of 
anti-competitive practices.6 
 
In a world of little or no market walls, the need to protect the competitive process 
against private restraints is now widely acknowledged. At the turn of the nineteenth 
century, only a few countries had competition legislation.7 While the development of 
competition law stalled in Europe during the late 19th century, in 1889 Canada enacted 
what is considered the first competition statute of modern times.8 The Act for the 
                                                          
1 Hopt KJ, Von Friedrich Kfibler ed Wetbewerbsbeschrankungen Und Verrechtlichung (1985) in Weiss F ‘From World 
Trade Law to World Competition’ Law (1999) 23 Fordham International Law Journal S250. 
2 Weiss F ‘From World Trade Law to World Competition’ Law (1999) 23 Fordham International Law Journal S250.  
3 Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism (2001) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell. 
4 Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism (2001) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell. 
5 Sweeney B ‘International Competition Law  and Policy: A Work in Progress’ 200910 MelbJIL 58.   
6 Sweeney B ‘International Competition Law  and Policy: A Work in Progress’ 200910 MelbJIL58.   
7 Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism (2001) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell. 
8 Papadopoulos AS The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (2010)  Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge.  
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Prevention and Suppression of Combinations formed in restraint of Trade was passed 
one year before the US enacted the most famous legal statute on competition law, 
the Sherman Act of 1890.9 In the late 1980s, only 20 jurisdictions had a system of 
competition law.10 Today, the number of countries adopting a competition law regime 
has expanded significantly.  More than one hundred nations have a competition law 
regime in place, among them many developing and former communist and socialist 
countries.11 
 
The expansion of the market place beyond traditional domestic borders has revealed 
important shortcomings in what has historically been a national approach to 
competition law and policy. It is important to note at the outset that competition law 
and competition policy are not synonymous. Competition law refers to law that 
promotes or seeks to maintain market competition by regulating anti-
competitive conduct by companies.12  In contrast, competition policy is a much broader 
concept than competition law. In its broadest sense, competition policy encompasses a 
set of policies and laws that protects, enhances and extends competition.13 Thus 
competition law is a sub-set of competition policy.  
 
Historically, competition law and policy were matters that were regarded as sovereign, 
with each national state determining according to the preferences of the nation's 
citizens.14 However, in today’s world the national approach to competition law and 
policy has proved to be insufficient for regulating trans-border transactions. National 
governments develop distinctive approaches to the regulation of conduct that affects its 
country, often without consideration of the effect of that regulation on other nations.15 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
9 Papadopoulos AS The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (2010) Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge.  
10 Sweeney B ‘International Competition Law  and Policy: A Work in Progress’ 200910 MelbJIL 58.   
11 Baetge D  ‘Competition Law and Perspectives for Harmonisation’ (2004) 9 Unif  LR 501.   
12 Taylor MD International Competition Law: a new dimension for the WTO? (2006) Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press p.1 
13 Evenett SJ  ‘What is the Relationship between Competition Law and Policy and Economic Development?’ ( 2005) 
University of Oxford available at  
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB8QFjAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.alex
andria.unisg.ch%2Fexport%2FDL%2F22316.pdf&ei=i6pSVNT1HMzeOK2gfgJ&usg=AFQjCNFC52UzUpGlc8HRRX1y7TviL
CKz5g&sig2=Vq1FOGgaB4pDlHKv3KS15g accessed on (19 February 2015). 
14 Piilola A ‘Is there a need for multinational competition rules?’ (1999) 10 Finnish YB Int'l L 263.  
15 Kelly  DA ‘Should the WTO have a Role to Play in the Internationalisation of Competition Law?’( 2007)  
7 Hibernian LJ 17.  
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Consequently, although the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has made tremendous 
progress in eradicating tariff barriers, trading nations have found alternative ways to 
protect their markets and favour their national champion enterprises using competition 
laws.16 Indeed, concern has been expressed that government/public restraints on trade 
might be replaced by restraints by private firms.17 Additional problem associated with 
the national approach includes the deficiency of a well-functioning enforcement 
mechanism.18 Therefore, in the era of an interdependent world economy, international 
or regional competition co-operation is necessary to achieve the economic goals of 
nation states. 
 
At this point, developing a multilateral competition framework seems ideal. It is after 
all universally acknowledged that anti-competitive practices within the international 
arena can adversely affect trade flows, and consequently undermine the benefits of 
trade liberalisation.19 However, it should be admitted that the implementation of the 
idea to develop a multilateral competition framework is currently farfetched, at least for 
the time being. Competition law and policy has been on the WTO agenda since 1996 but 
progress has been very slow. Currently the developing states are not prepared to accept 
a multilateral competition agreement.20 Therefore competition law and policy remains 
outside the realm of the international legal system and predominantly consists of a 
patch-work system of national laws. 
 
On a positive note, some countries recognising that in the era of a globalised economy, 
restrictive business practices by private firms can pose as impediments to trade have 
devised regional competition law regimes to address these barriers. Moreover, 
considering the WTO’s stalled discussion on developing a multilateral competition 
regulatory framework, Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) constitute an interesting 
testing ground to conceptualise international provisions on competition.21 Ideally, the 
progress made at a regional level may eventually bloom to a multilateral framework. 
                                                          
16 Piilola A ‘Is there a need for multinational competition rules?’ (1999) 10 Finnish YB Int'l L 263.  
17 Kelly  DA ‘Should the WTO have a Role to Play in the Internationalisation of Competition Law?’( 2007) 
7 Hibernian LJ 17. 
18 Baetge D  ‘Competition Law and Perspectives for Harmonisation’ (2004) 9 Unif  LR 501.   
19 Kelly  DA ‘Should the WTO have a Role to Play in the Internationalisation of Competition Law?’( 2007)  
7 Hibernian LJ 17.  
20 Sweeney B Globalisation of Competition Law and Policy: Some Aspects of the Interface between Trade and 
Competition (2004) MelbJIL 375. 
21 Hilpold P ‘International competition law and Regional Trade Agreements’ (2005) 2 MJIEL 82.  
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Regional competition regimes are usually results of free trade agreements, which are 
completed by rules to control anti-competitive practices in order not to compromise the 
gains of free trade in the region.22 Here ‘regional’ agreements contrary to what might be 
implied from a literal interpretation of this concept do not only include countries which 
are geographically neighbours.23 In the WTO context, RTAs are defined as reciprocal 
trade agreements between two or more partners.24 They include free trade agreements 
and customs unions.25  
 
To appreciate the concept of RTAs, the starting point is to understand the basic 
principle in WTO law; the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clause. According to the MFN 
clause, any concession granted to one member has to be granted also to any other 
member.26 The possibility to create RTAs constitutes the most important exception to 
the MFN principle: If the conditions set out in art XXIV of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are fulfilled concessions may be granted also among a 
restricted group of members.27 The main conditions are the requirements that such an 
agreement shall comprise ‘substantially all the trade’ and that the ‘duties and other 
regulations of commerce’ in force after the creation of the RTA shall not be higher than 
those in force before.28 If these conditions are fulfilled it is assumed that the respective 
RTA ‘facilitates trade between the constituent territories and does not raise barriers.’29 
 
As would be expected, trade in a regional integration zone suffers potentially less from 
governmental business restrictions than from private ones.30 Even where there are 
government restraints, GATT law applies. However there is little or no redress for 
private restraints since competition law has been spared out from the GATT law; art 
XXIV on RTAs says nothing about this issue. It is therefore not surprising that the most 
successful integration zone so far, the European Union (EU), has devoted so much 
importance to her competition policy which at present is said to be the most prominent 
                                                          
22 Piilola A ‘Is there a need for multinational competition rules?’ (1999) 10 Finnish YB Int'l L 263. 
23 Hilpold P ‘International competition law and Regional Trade Agreements’ (2005) 2 MJIEL 82. 
24WTO Regional Trade Agreements and Preferential Trade Arrangements, (2015) available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/rta_pta_e.htm accessed on (20 February, 2015).  
25 Article XXIV GATT. 
26 Article I GATT. 
27 Hilpold P ‘International competition law and Regional Trade Agreements’ (2005) 2 MJIEL 82. 
28 Article XXIV para. 8 GATT.  
29 Article XXIV para. 4 GATT. 
30 Hilpold P ‘International competition law and Regional Trade Agreements’ (2005) 2 MJIEL 82. 
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and most efficient policies of this entity.31 According to art 101 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), cartels, such as anticompetitive agreements 
are prohibited. Further, art 102 TFEU prohibits abuses of dominant positions.  
 
In Africa, the Common Market of Eastern Southern Africa (COMESA) has recently 
adopted a regional competition regulatory framework- namely, the COMESA 
Competition Regulations. The regulations were promulgated in realisation that an 
efficient and integrated Common Market cannot thrive in an environment where firms 
engage in restrictive business practices which deter the efficient operation of the 
Common Market.32 Thus, the primary aim of the regulations is to ensure the efficient 
operation of the markets with the view to enhancing free and liberalised trade as a 
prerequisite to safeguarding the welfare of consumers.33 The COMESA Competition 
Commission (CCC) is a body corporate that will be responsible for promoting fair 
competition and penalising uncompetitive practices in the region. All agreements and 
undertakings between parties which have as their objective or effect the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition within COMESA are generally prohibited and 
declared void.34 Prohibited practices include inter alia, price fixing arrangements, 
collusive tendering, market or customer allocation agreements, and abuse of dominant 
positions.35 
 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC), as is the case with COMESA, 
is effectively a free trade area with a significant amount of market integration and cross 
border business activities.36 As a result of the apparent overlap between competition 
law and trade, SADC adopted a Declaration on Regional Cooperation in Competition 
and Consumer Policies (‘the SADC Declaration’) in 2009. The SADC Declaration 
                                                          
31 Hilpold P ‘International competition law and Regional Trade Agreements’ (2005) 2 MJIEL 82. 
32 COMESA Competition Commission Background available at http://www.comesacompetition.org/?page_id=375 accessed 
on (20 February, 2015).  
33 COMESA Competition Commission Background available at http://www.comesacompetition.org/?page_id=375 accessed 
on (20 February, 2015). 
34 COMESA Competition Commission A Guide to Anti-Competitive Business Practices available at 
http://www.comesacompetition.org/?page_id=498 accessed on (20 February, 2015). 
35 COMESA Competition Commission A Guide to Anti-Competitive Business Practices available at 
http://www.comesacompetition.org/?page_id=498 accessed on (20 February, 2015). 
36 Senona L, Letsike T, and Jiki C ‘ A SADC sheriff to police anti-competitive behaviour – is it the way to go, or not?’ 
available at http://www.compcom.co.za/assets/Uploads/events/Seventh-Annual-Conference-on-Competition-Law-Economics-
Policy/Parallel-4/SADC-Sheriff-Paper-Final-Draft-21-August-13.pdf accessed on 24 October, 2014. 
 
 
 
 
6 
 
specifically deals with the issue of effective cooperation of competition agencies within 
the region.  
 
Unlike COMESA or the EU, SADC does not have a supra-national competition 
authority. SADC deals with cross border competition issues through friendly 
consultation, information sharing and best endeavour clauses. Unfortunately, in the 
absence of supranational procedures for dispute settlement and enforcement, it is 
challenging to curb cross-border anti-competitive in SADC.  
 
1.2 Problem statement 
Fair competition among businesses is a cornerstone of free trade and is vital to 
the economic development of a region, playing an important role in promoting growth, 
efficiency, and the alleviation of poverty.37 Anti-competitive trade practices have the 
effect of distorting this free trade between and among developing countries. However, 
considering that competition law is currently outside the realm of international law, 
regional trade agreements hold great potential for overcoming the major enforcement 
problems of developing jurisdictions.38  
 
In view of the adverse effects of anti-competitive practices on trade, SADC adopted the 
Declaration on regional cooperation in competition and consumer policies which 
provide for cooperation between member states in the area of competition law. The 
cooperation model however does not provide for supranational procedures to deal with 
dispute settlement on anti-competitive behaviour or enforcement. 
 
The absence of a regional competition regulatory framework in SADC, poses a great 
challenge in curbing anti-competitive trade practices at a regional level. SADC 
economies are diverse and at different levels of development. On the one hand there is 
South Africa with a sophisticated economy and vibrant domestic competition authority, 
                                                          
37 SADC ‘Competition Policy’ (2012) available at http://www.sadc.int/themes/economic-development/trade/competition-
policy/  accessed on (28 October 2014).  
38 Gal MS and Wassmer IF ‘Regional Agreements of Developing Jurisdictions: Unleashing the Potential in Competition 
Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries’, (2012) Bakhoum M, Drexl J, Gal M,  Gerber D, Fox E (eds) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920290  (accessed on 24th October, 2014). 
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well equipped to address any type of anti-competitive behaviour.39 On the other hand 
there are relatively small to least developed economies such as Zambia, Lesotho and 
Namibia with less capacity to deal effectively with cross-border anti-competitive 
behaviour; let alone anti-competitive behaviour by foreign multinational firms.40  
Therefore, there may be need to develop a regional competition regulatory framework 
in SADC to improve the efficiency of dispute settlement and enforcement of 
competition law matters at a regional level.   
 
1.3 Research hypothesis 
The research examines the assumption that the current cooperation model adopted by 
SADC is not effective enough to address anti-competitive trade practices within the 
region.  
 
1.4 Aim of research  
This study aims to evaluate the prospective benefits and challenges of developing a 
regional competition regulatory framework in SADC. Further, the study seeks to 
identify important lessons from the EU and COMESA that are crucial for the pursuance 
of a regional competition regulatory framework.  
 
1.5 Research questions 
The main question this paper seeks to answer is what are the prospective benefits and 
challenges of developing a regional competition regulatory framework in SADC? To 
answer this question, the following sub-questions will be addressed: 
 
1. What is the interaction between competition law and international trade? 
2.  What are the challenges of the cooperation model in addressing cross-border 
anti-competitive practices in SADC?  
3. What are the legal implications of the establishment of a regional competition 
regulatory framework in SADC?  
4. What lessons can SADC learn from the EU and COMESA competition regimes?  
                                                          
39 Gal MS and Wassmer IF ‘Regional Agreements of Developing Jurisdictions: Unleashing the Potential in Competition 
Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries’, (2012) Bakhoum M, Drexl J, Gal M,  Gerber D, Fox E (eds) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920290  (accessed on 24th October, 2014). 
40 Gal MS and Wassmer IF ‘Regional Agreements of Developing Jurisdictions: Unleashing the Potential in Competition 
Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries’, (2012) Bakhoum M, Drexl J, Gal M,  Gerber D, Fox E (eds) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920290  (accessed on 24th October, 2014). 
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1.6 Scope of study 
It is admitted that competition law and international trade are two broad concepts. 
Therefore, the paper focuses on the idea of curbing anti-competitive behaviour in SADC 
so as to promote regional trade.  
 
1.7 Research methodology  
The study will be based on a desktop and library study. The primary sources of 
information will be case law, treaties, protocols, memorandum of understanding 
agreements, and articles written by experts and organisations in the field. The 
secondary sources will include textbooks and information available from electronic 
resources and databases.  
 
A comparative study will be used to indicate the experiences of other regions in the 
pursuance of region competition regulatory framework. The comparison will be limited 
to the EU which is arguably the most successful regional competition regime in the 
world, and COMESA a budding competition regulatory regime in Southern and Eastern 
Africa.   
 
1.8 Significance of study 
As part of the process of consolidating the SADC free trade area, and to address all 
forms of barriers to trade including those in the area of competition policy, the SADC 
secretariat recently embarked on an assessment exercise of the existence of, and possible 
remedies for, cross-border anti-competitive business practices.41 This paper will provide 
a useful evaluation to the SADC secretariat on whether a regional competition 
regulatory framework is a viable means of dealing with cross-border anti-competitive 
practices in SADC. Further, the study will fill the gap in the existing literature on the 
prospective benefits and challenges of developing a regional competition regulatory 
framework in SADC.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
41 Drexl J (ed) Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries (2012) 64 Northampton MA: Edward 
Elgar Publishing.  
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1.9 Sequencing of chapters 
The topic under examination will be discussed in five chapters.  
 
Chapter One  
This chapter introduces the research and discusses the problem of the study. Further, it 
sets out the context of the research in terms of identifying the problem and outlining the 
methodology.  
 
Chapter Two  
Chapter two generally provides a conceptual and theoretical framework of the paper. It 
does so by discussing the interaction between competition law and international trade, 
theories and levels of competition regulation and the current status of competition law 
under the WTO multilateral framework.   
 
Chapter Three 
This chapter will discuss the current competition regime in SADC. The chapter will 
highlight the challenges of the cooperation model adopted by SADC in addressing anti-
competitive trade practices.  
 
Chapter Four 
This chapter focuses on the prospective benefits and challenges of developing a regional 
competition regulatory framework in SADC. It also discusses the legal implications of 
developing a regional regulatory framework and lessons to learn from EU and 
COMESA. 
Chapter Five  
Finally, this chapter concludes the research and proposes recommendations on whether 
SADC should develop a regional competition regulatory framework.  
 
1.10    Conclusion 
To sum up, it cannot be overemphasised that trade liberalisation has opened up a whole 
new dimension to competition law and policy. What was once a domestic issue, anti-
competitive trade practices are now an international concern or to the very least a 
regional concern. In view of this transition, national approach to competition law and 
policy has proved to be insufficient for regulating cross-border anti-competitive 
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practices. Thus in today’s global economy it is proposed to look into other avenues of 
regulating competition beyond the national laws. 
It need not be speculated that anti-competitive practices by private enterprises have a 
bearing on the progressive liberalisation of trade. It is therefore imperative that one 
clearly understands the interaction between competition law and international trade. 
The succeeding chapter will discuss the interaction between international trade and 
competition law. It will also define the much recurring concepts of competition, 
competition law, competition policy, competition regulation and international trade.      
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND 
COMPETITION LAW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
It is now widely recognised that competition law can complement the advancements 
made by trade policies in achieving open and accessible markets.42  At the same time, 
opening the global market has had a significant impact on competition law.43 As such, it 
is inevitable that there is some degree of interaction between international trade and 
competition law.  
 
This chapter discusses the interaction between international trade and competition law 
in five parts. First, the chapter begins by defining the concepts of competition, 
competition law and competition policy. Secondly, it analyses the interaction between 
international trade and competition law. Thirdly, it lays down the theories of 
competition regulation. Fourthly, it outlines the levels of competition regulation and 
finally it discusses the status of competition law at the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO).  
  
2.2       Understanding the concepts of competition law and policy 
 ‘Competition’ is an everyday word meaning a struggle or contention for superiority, 
and in the commercial world this means striving for the custom and business of people 
in the market place.44 
 
It has been argued that in competition, only the fittest survive.45 For small businesses 
with fewer capital and resources, the survival of the fittest notion may seem somewhat 
                                                          
42 Epstein J. ‘The other side of harmony: Can trade and competition laws work together in the international 
marketplace?’ (2002) 17 American University ILR 343.  
43 Kelly  DA ‘Should the WTO have a role to play in the internationalisation of competition law?’(2007) 7 Hibernian LJ 
17. 
44 Kellerhals A & Mahncke H  ‘Competition law in difficult economic times’(2009) 39 Hong Kong LJ 719.   
45 Islam  M.R ‘A WTO multilateral framework for competition policy and trade-induced development- Debunkig 
their complementarity in developing countries’ (2004) 5 J World Investment & Trade 491.   
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unfair.46 When these small businesses are faced with heavy competition especially on 
the international market, national governments may feel inclined to shield the domestic 
market from competition.47 However, competition ought not to be shunned outright; 
rather, healthy competition – where smaller businesses that are efficient are able to 
grow - should be encouraged.  
 
Competition is important as it encourages innovative activities and increases 
productivity and efficiency.48 In addition, competition provides for a greater variety and 
better product quality for a lower price and is therefore in the interest of consumers.49 In 
view of the benefits of competition, competition law and policy are there to ensure that 
competition in the market place is not restricted in a way that is detrimental to society.50  
 
Whilst it is tempting to use competition law and competition policy interchangeably, 
the two concepts are not synonymous.51 Generally speaking, competition law is one of 
the policy options available to governments to prevent or eliminate anti-competitive 
practices by businesses.52 Regarded the optimal form of government intervention, 
competition law refers to the minimum necessary regulation of competition consistent 
with the correction of market failures associated with market power and the 
maximisation of economic efficiency.53   
 
Competition laws vary from nation to nation, however, there are certain core provisions 
which underpin nearly all competition law regimes and these include: prohibitions on 
anti-competitive cartel activities (such as price fixing and market sharing by 
competitors), anti-competitive conduct by dominant firms, and mergers that 
                                                          
46 Ergas H ‘Should developed countries require developing countries to adopt competition laws? Lessons from the 
economic literature’ (2009) European Competition Journal 347.  
47 Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism (2001) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell.  
48 Sweeney B ‘Globalisation of competition law and policy: Some aspects of the interface between trade and 
competition (2004) MelbJIL 375. 
49 Kellerhals A & Mahncke H  ‘Competition law in difficult economic times’(2009) 39 Hong Kong LJ 719.   
50 European Commission Competition (2012) available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consumers/why_en.html accessed 
on 27 (April 2015). 
51Sweeney B ‘Globalisation of competition law and policy: Some aspects of the interface between trade and 
competition (2004) MelbJIL 375. 
52 Sweeney B ‘Globalisation of competition law and policy: Some aspects of the interface between trade and 
competition (2004) MelbJIL 375. 
53 Taylor MD International Competition Law: A New Dimension for the WTO? (2006) Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press p. 326. 
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substantially reduce competition.54 In the United States (US), competition law (other 
than mergers) is referred to as ‘antitrust law’. The expression ‘competition law’ will be 
used throughout this paper. 
 
Competition policy is a much broader concept than competition law. In its broadest 
sense, competition policy encompasses a set of policies and laws that protects, enhances 
and extends competition.55 Admittedly, this definition has a somewhat circular 
reasoning.   
 
The broad nature of competition policy has rendered it difficult to define the concept in 
a few words. Competition policy is therefore capable of many definitions. The World 
Trade Organisation(WTO) Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and 
Competition policy (WGTCP) defines competition policy as the policies which 
‘comprise the full range of measures that maybe used to promote competitive markets 
structures and behaviour, including but not limited to a comprehensive competition 
law dealing with anti-competitive practices of enterprises.’56 
 
Various authors have also attempted to define competition policy. Kennedy perceives 
competition policy as having evolved from competition law.57 He argues that 
competition law was until a few years ago purely a domestic issue but today, it has a 
new name- competition policy, signifying a set of issues broader than the prescriptive 
rules of competition law.58 In Kennedy’s view, this change was triggered by several 
factors including the simultaneous trends toward globalisation and regional integration, 
                                                          
54 Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism (2001) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, p. 1-2.  
55 Evenett SJ  ‘What is the relationship between competition law and policy and economic development?’ ( 2005) 
University of Oxford available at 
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved=0CB8QFjAA&url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.alex
andria.unisg.ch%2Fexport%2FDL%2F22316.pdf&ei=i6pSVNT1HMzeOK2gfgJ&usg=AFQjCNFC52UzUpGlc8HRRX1y7TviL
CKz5g&sig2=Vq1FOGgaB4pDlHKv3KS15g accessed on (30 October 2014). 
56 WTO Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition policy The Fundamental Principles of 
 Competition Policy , (1999) WT/WGTCP/W/127, para 2.  
57 Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism (2001) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell.  
58 Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism (2001) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, p. 1-2. 
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the creation of the WTO and the growing number of competition cases involving more 
than one country.59   
 
Perhaps the broader issues referred by Kennedy consist of what Sweeney includes in 
his definition of competition policy namely, government policies on deregulation, 
privatisation, foreign direct investment, and government procurement practices.60 
Further, Sweeney argues that when used in its broadest sense, competition policy also 
refers to all those factors which influence the nation’s competition conditions, including 
trade policy and industry policy.61 
 
In the same line of thought as Sweeney, Swann argues that competition policy includes 
other conditions that affect competition such as administrative complications which 
arise when goods cross frontiers.62 Some of them which ‘arise from disparities between 
the indirect taxation system of different member states, subsidies, the effects of differing 
national laws and standards in respect of the design and composition of goods.’63 
Furthermore, intellectual property laws have also been considered part of competition 
policy as they allow consumers to make choices between competing entrepreneurs, and 
the goods and services they sell.64  
 
While competition policy is capable of many definitions, this paper discusses 
competition policy in the context of international trade. Therefore trade policies will not 
be embedded within the meaning of competition policy. Competition policy will be 
understood to encompass competition law and government policy towards the 
implementation of the law.  
 
Since the paper focuses on developing a regional competition regulatory framework in 
SADC, the paper is concerned primarily with competition law. However, where 
                                                          
59 Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism (2001) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell.  
60 Sweeney B ‘Globalisation of competition law and policy: Some aspects of the interface between trade and 
competition (2004) MelbJIL 375. 
61 Sweeney B ‘Globalisation of competition law and policy: Some aspects of the interface between trade and 
competition (2004) MelbJIL 375. 
62 Swann D Competition and Industrial Policy in the European Community (1983) London: Methuen. 
63 Swann D Competition and Industrial Policy in the European Community (1983) London: Methuen. 
64 Correa CM ‘Intellectual property and competition law: Exploring some issues of relevance to developing countries’ 
(2007) Issue Paper No. 21, Geneva: ICTSD, available at http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/docs/corea_Oct07.pdf accessed 
on (10 March 2015). 
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competition policy is mentioned, it will be in reference to both competition law and 
government policy on competition.  
 
Where concepts of competition law and competition policy are used throughout the 
paper, they carry the meanings adopted above. 
 
2.3 The interaction between international trade and competition law  
The concepts of competition law and international trade have important 
complementarities and differences that define their relationship.  
 
2.3.1 Convergences of trade and competition law 
The close and complementary relationship between competition law and international 
trade is founded on the similarity of their objectives: both trade and competition law 
aim to enhance welfare through the provision of a more efficient allocation of resources, 
whether it be by lowering governmental barriers to trade or through promoting 
competition respectively.65 
 
Besides sharing similar goals, competition law and the concept of ‘liberal trade’ in 
international trade are also interrelated, and are partially overlapping.66 Although not 
explicitly stated in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or any other 
WTO agreement, the guiding economic premise that underlies the entire GATT 
agreement system is open trade, also known as liberal trade.67 Liberal trade policies 
permit the unrestricted cross-border flow of the highest quality goods and services at 
the lowest prices.68 Liberal trade is grounded on the principle of ‘comparative 
advantage’ which says that countries prosper first by taking advantage of their assets in 
order to concentrate on what they can produce best, and then by trading these products 
for products that other countries produce best.69 In other words, to reap the benefits of 
liberal trade, countries have to produce the best products, with the best design, at the 
                                                          
65 Weiss F ‘From world trade law to world competition law’ (1999) 23 Fordham International Law Journal 250. 
66 Weiss F ‘From world trade law to world competition law’ (1999) 23 Fordham International Law Journal 250. 
67 Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism (2001) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, p. 1-2. 
68 Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism (2001) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, p. 1-2. 
69 WTO The Case for Open Trade (2015) available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact3_e.htm 
accessed on (25 February 2015).  
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best price. In the end, liberal trade policies not only allow the unrestricted flow of goods 
and services but like competition law also sharpen competition and motivate 
innovation.70  
 
Another key element in the convergence between competition law and international 
trade is that both affect access to markets.71 The two policies strive to eliminate or 
reduce market distortions and barriers to market entry to promote efficiency and 
contribute towards increased welfare.72 While the removal of external governmental 
trade barriers facilitates market entry, the control of anti-competitive conduct by market 
operators opens access to competitive markets.73 In combination, potential welfare gains 
derived from comparative advantage are made safe against anti-competitive erosion.74 
 
2.3.2 Divergences of trade and competition law 
Despite their intimate interrelationship and common economic objective, care must be 
taken not to overstate the synergy between trade and competition law.75 There are some 
critical points of departure.  
 
Traditionally, competition laws were a tool employed by governments in order to 
address issues relating to restrictions of trade conducted by private firms within the 
national borders.76 Competition laws focus on ‘behind the border’ (national) issues and 
is largely based on domestic legal principles intended to maximise economic 
efficiencies.77 In contrast, trade laws mainly regulate acts by government or public 
bodies that restrain the free flow of goods and services between and amongst 
countries.78 Trade laws focus on ‘at the border issues’, whereby governments create 
                                                          
70 WTO The Case for Open Trade (2015) available at https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact3_e.htm 
accessed on (25 February 2015). 
71 Piilola A ‘Is there a need for multinational competition rules?’ (1999) 10 Finnish YB Int'l L 263. 
72 OECD Complementarities between Trade and Competition Policies, (1999) 12 Unclassified 
COM/TD/DAFFE/CLP(98)98/FINAL.  
73 Weiss F ‘From world trade law to world competition law’ (1999) 23 Fordham International Law Journal 250. 
74 Weiss F ‘From world trade law to world competition law’ (1999) 23 Fordham International Law Journal 250. 
75 Sweeney B ‘Globalisation of competition law and policy: Some aspects of the interface between trade and 
competition (2004) MelbJIL 375. 
76 Epstein J. ‘The other side of harmony: Can trade and competition laws work together in the international 
marketplace?’ (2002) 17 American University ILR 343.  
77 Piilola A ‘Is there a need for multinational competition rules?’ (1999) 10 Finnish YB Int'l L 263. 
78 Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism (2001) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell.  
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tariff and non-tariff market barriers, thereby protecting domestic producers at the 
expense of foreign competitors.79  
 
The different actors in trade and competition law perhaps explain why trade unlike 
competition law has international roots. Trade law aims to regulate the acts of 
governments at an international level and seeks to achieve efficiency in more general 
terms and from the global perspective. 80 It does so by safeguarding competitive 
opportunities rather than competition itself in some specific market. In contrast, 
competition laws are more of a national nature and the prime concern of competition 
law is the welfare of consumers in a certain market.81 
 
Further, unlike competition laws, trade law is aimed at opening markets to exporters 
and protecting domestic industries, not at optimising market place efficiencies and 
consumer benefits.82 
 
In short, the two bodies of law and policy generally involve different actors with 
different institutional perspectives, cultures, methods of dispute resolution, and legal 
principles. 
 
2.3.3 Analysis of the interaction between trade and competition law 
The relationship between trade and competition law has received creative definitions 
by various authors. According to Nkomo and Van Wyk trade and competition law are 
‘frenemies’; friendly towards each other despite their rivalry.83 In Kelly’s view their 
relationship is uneasy84 and to Weiss it is ‘not necessarily stable’.85  Epstein describes the 
harmonisation of world's competition laws as the new ‘Achilles heel’ of international 
trade as it is a ‘difficult’ but necessary step.86    
 
                                                          
79 Weiss F ‘From world trade law to world competition law’ (1999) 23 Fordham International Law Journal 250. 
80 Piilola A ‘Is there a need for multinational competition rules?’ (1999) 10 Finnish YB Int'l L 263. 
81 Piilola A ‘Is there a need for multinational competition rules?’ (1999) 10 Finnish YB Int'l L 263. 
82 Sweeney B ‘Globalisation of competition law and policy: Some aspects of the interface between trade and 
competition (2004) MelbJIL 375. 
83 Marumo N and Van Wyk M ‘Competition and trade policy - Frenemies?’ Available at http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/Competition-and-Trade-Policy-Frenemies.pdf accessed on (26 February). 
84 Kelly DA ‘Should the WTO have a role to play in the internationalisation of competition law?’( 2007) 7 Hibernian LJ 
17.  
85 Weiss F ‘From world trade law to world competition law’ (1999) 23 Fordham International Law Journal 250. 
86 Weiss F ‘From world trade law to world competition law’ (1999) 23 Fordham International Law Journal 250. 
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As discussed earlier, trade and competition law share the common goals of increasing 
efficiency and encouraging market access. Thus, in the process of reaching those goals, 
the two policies can be said to be mutually consistent and reinforcing.87  Nevertheless, 
the means to achieving these common objectives are different and this creates tension.88  
 
At their worst point of divergence, trade laws may have an adverse effect on 
competition and competition law may impede trade. On one hand, the underlying 
rationale of multilateral trade liberalisation is to increase aggregate world wealth and to 
achieve global productive efficiency.89 On the other hand competition law is focused on 
enhancing consumer welfare within national markets.90 Further, unlike competition 
policy, national trade policy is consumed with fashioning adequate trade remedy laws 
such as safeguards, anti-dumping and countervailing duty.91 
 
As a result of these vital divergences, national trade policy makers and legislators are in 
some instances faced with a dilemma whether to sacrifice consumer welfare to protect 
producers within an industry threatened by import competition.92 A good example of 
this dilemma is reflected in the issue of import tariff hike on frozen poultry in South 
Africa (SA).  
 
In January 2012, the International Trade Administration Commission of South Africa 
(ITAC) imposed provisional anti-dumping duties on Brazil’s chicken imports. The 
decision was a result of an investigation which found that three Brazilian exporters sold 
their chicken meat in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) market at lower 
prices93 compared with the Brazilian market.94 ITAC concluded that SACU chicken 
                                                          
87 Piilola A ‘Is there a need for multinational competition rules?’ (1999) 10 Finnish YB Int'l L 263. 
88 Marumo N and Van Wyk M ‘Competition and trade policy - Frenemies?’ Available at http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/Competition-and-Trade-Policy-Frenemies.pdf accessed on (26 February). 
89 Kelly DA ‘Should the WTO have a role to play in the internationalisation of competition law?’( 2007) 7 Hibernian LJ 
17.  
90 Kelly DA ‘Should the WTO have a role to play in the internationalisation of competition law?’( 2007) 7 Hibernian LJ 
17. 
91 Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism (2001) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell. 
92 Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism (2001) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell. 
93 Aurora Alimentos, Sao Paulo-based Brasil Foods, and Palotina-based C Vale, exported at prices that were 6.3 %, 
62.9% and 46.6% lower respectively. 
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producers had suffered material injury  from the increased chicken imports as they 
experienced a substantial decline in profits, price under-cutting, reduced market share, 
decrease in growth of revenue, and under-utilisation of production capacity.95 
 
In a twist of events, in January 2013, SA’s Department of Trade and Industry rejected 
ITAC’s bid to impose definitive anti-dumping duties on Brazilian poultry.96 Instead it 
raised import tariffs on five types of chickens, the whole bird being hit worst from 27% 
paid previously to 82%.97   
 
The tariff hike of frozen poultry raised an important policy debate between the trade 
and competition policy makers. From the point of view of the South Africa’s Poultry 
Association (SAPA), representing the domestic producers, the aim of the tariffs was not 
to be punitive, nor reduce volumes of imports, but to put importers and local producers 
on an equal competitive footing.98 They submitted that the local poultry industry was 
struggling due to dumped imports and therefore needed protection from the vast 
increase in imports, which had suppressed prices.99  
 
Obviously, the competition commission had a contrary view. The Commission was 
clear on the fact that it was on the side of the consumers.100 From a competition 
perspective, imports might force domestic producers to compete, resulting in lower 
prices for consumers and more product choices.101 In the Commission’s view, increasing 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
94 Ndlovu P ‘South African trade: Too chicken to definitively challenge Brazilian poultry imports?’ (2013) available at 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/south-african-trade-too-chicken-to-definitively-challenge-brazilian-poultry-imports-2013-09-17 
accessed on (18 November 2014). 
95 Ndlovu P ‘South African trade: Too chicken to definitively challenge Brazilian poultry imports?’ (2013) available at 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/south-african-trade-too-chicken-to-definitively-challenge-brazilian-poultry-imports-2013-09-17 
accessed on (18 November 2014). 
96 Ndlovu P ‘South African trade: Too chicken to definitively challenge Brazilian poultry imports?’ (2013) available at 
http://www.polity.org.za/article/south-african-trade-too-chicken-to-definitively-challenge-brazilian-poultry-imports-2013-09-17 
accessed on (18 November 2014). 
97 FSP Invest ‘Will raising the tariffs on chicken imports have the desired effect?’ available at 
http://fspinvest.co.za/articles/south-africa/will-raising-the-tariffs-on-chicken-imports-have-the-desired-effect-1708.html accessed 
on (19 November, 2014).  
98 Marumo N and Van Wyk M ‘Competition and trade policy - Frenemies?’ Available at http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/Competition-and-Trade-Policy-Frenemies.pdf accessed on (26 February). 
99 Marumo N and Van Wyk M ‘Competition and trade policy - Frenemies?’ Available at http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-
content/uploads/2014/09/Competition-and-Trade-Policy-Frenemies.pdf accessed on (26 February). 
100 Competition Commission of South Africa The Impact of Poultry Tariffs on Competition (2013) available at http://pmg-
assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/130910impact.pdf accessed on (27 February 2015).  
101 Competition Commission of South Africa The Impact of Poultry Tariffs on Competition (2013) available at http://pmg-
assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/130910impact.pdf accessed on (27 February 2015). 
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import tariffs may mean the sustainability of poultry producers with poor operational 
performance at the expense of consumers, less product choice and high prices, which 
impacts on food security.102 Unfortunately, for SA consumers, this was one clear case 
where the national trade policy makers and legislators indeed sacrificed consumer 
welfare to protect domestic producers from import competition.  
 
Notwithstanding their rivalry, there is interdependence between trade and competition 
law. International trade law complements competition law by facilitating the removal of 
certain governmental structural measures that would otherwise facilitate anti-
competitive behaviour by private enterprises and would have been addressed by 
competition law alone.103 Competition law aids international trade by providing a 
means to regulate private anticompetitive activity, thereby providing an important 
mechanism for promoting greater market access for foreign firms.104  
 
In short, it can be concluded that trade and competition law often has a symbiotic, albeit 
at times problematic, relationship. One cannot survive without the other. In the absence 
of an effective competition law, the gains from liberalised trade may be undermined 
because of private restraints that deter or prevent access to foreign goods and services. 
Conversely, the absence of trade liberalisation deters access to pro-competitive foreign 
goods and producers, therefore hindering the ability of competition law to promote the 
contestability of markets. 
 
2.4   Theories of competition regulation. 
There are a number of theories that explain why competition regulation should or 
should not exist. The phrase ‘competition regulation’ here is understood to mean 
governance of competition using competition laws. This paper will focus on two broad 
schools of thought; one camp in support of free competition and another in support of 
competition regulation.  
 
                                                          
102 Competition Commission of South Africa The Impact of Poultry Tariffs on Competition (2013) available at http://pmg-
assets.s3-website-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/130910impact.pdf accessed on (27 February 2015). 
103 Kelly DA ‘Should the WTO have a Role to Play in the Internationalisation of Competition Law?’( 2007) 7 Hibernian 
LJ 17. 
104 Kelly DA ‘Should the WTO have a role to play in the internationalisation of competition law?’( 2007) 7 Hibernian LJ 
17. 
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The issue of competition regulation has been addressed particularly by economists, 
lawyers and political scientists. All three disciplines were later influenced by sociology 
which, despite developing relatively recently, often provides guiding principles for 
other disciplines.105 This paper is law centred, however, it is admitted that the economic, 
sociological, and political reasoning of competition regulation are unavoidable. With 
that in mind, the following discussion will take into account various economic schools 
of thought that have influenced competition law over time; particularly the Classical, 
Neo-Classical, Harvard, Chicago, and Post-Chicago schools.  
 
2.4.1 Free competition 
Proponents for free competition believe that a free market should be free from 
intervention, restraint or regulation.106 An insightful explanation of free competition is 
given in the Classical and Neo-Classical economic theories which believed in individual 
autonomy and the welfare-generating capacity of self-interest.107  
 
The Classical theory dates back to the 17th century when Adam Smith published his 
seminal work, The Wealth of Nations (1776), in which he explains that individuals 
pursuing self-interest will promote societal welfare, primarily by generating wealth.108 
He considered competition as a race by individuals which make them improve their 
production and force price of the traded products be lower, thereby benefiting the 
whole community.109 Smith also introduced the ‘Invisible Hand’ theory which suggests 
that free market economies left to their own devices will produce results more beneficial 
than can be realised by intervening in the markets.110  
 
                                                          
105 Andriychuk O ‘The concept of perfect competition as the law of economics: addressing the homonymy problem’  ( 
2011) 62 N. Ir. Legal Q. 523. 
106 Brassey M, Campbell J, Legh R, Simkins C, UnterHalter D, Wilson J Competition Law 1 ed (2002) Cape Town: Juta.  
107 Smith A ‘The wealth of nations'(1975)  J M Dent & Sons in Nicholas E. (ed) ‘Adam smith's legacy: His thought in 
our time’ (1990) ASI (Research) Limited: London available at 
http://www.adamsmith.org/sites/default/files/images/uploads/publications/ADAM_SMITH_Legacy.pdf accessed on (10 March 
2015). 
108 Papadopoulos AS The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (2010) Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press p. 268. 
109 Smith A ‘The wealth of nations'(1975) J M Dent & Sons in Nicholas E. (ed) ‘Adam smith's legacy: His thought in 
our time’ (1990) ASI (Research) Limited: London available at 
http://www.adamsmith.org/sites/default/files/images/uploads/publications/ADAM_SMITH_Legacy.pdf accessed on (10 March 
2015). 
110 Smith, A ‘The theory of moral sentiments’ (1976) in The Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam 
Smith, Oxford University Press: London. 
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Smith ultimately took a laissez-faire approach to competition law. 111 In The Wealth of 
Nations he pointed out the problem of cartel, but did not advocate legal measures to 
combat them. He argued as follows: 
‘People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in 
some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such 
meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent 
with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same 
trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate 
such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.’112  
 
Later on, another team of economists attempted to add to Smith’s theory by 
incorporating mathematics in the analysis of markets.113 According to these Neo-
classical theorists, the adjective ‘free’ in ‘free competition’ is used in equilibrium 
economics in its technical, economic sense.114 To them, it is a mechanism of price 
determination, which implies that suppliers and consumers are not restrained in their 
choices and react on the situation in the markets by changing their respective supply 
and demand.115 That is to say, in a free market economy the price of any product is set 
by the relationship between the demand for the product and the supply of the 
product.116 For example, the greater the supply, and the less the demand, the less the 
price of the product will be. 
 
                                                          
111 Ross ‘Canadian competition policy: Progress and prospects’ The Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol 37 No 2 (May 
2004) 243 at 252-253. 
112 Smith A ‘The wealth of nations'(1975)  J M Dent & Sons in Nicholas E. (ed) ‘Adam smith's legacy: His thought in 
our time’ (1990) ASI (Research) Limited: London available at 
http://www.adamsmith.org/sites/default/files/images/uploads/publications/ADAM_SMITH_Legacy.pdf accessed on (10 March 
2015).  
113 Papadopoulos AS The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (2010)  Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge p. 268.  
114 Andriychuk O ‘The concept of perfect competition as the law of economics: addressing the homonymy problem’  ( 
2011) 62 N. Ir. Legal Q. 523. 
115 Andriychuk O ‘The concept of perfect competition as the law of economics: addressing the homonymy problem’ ( 
2011) 62 N. Ir. Legal Q. 523. 
116 Nicholas E. (ed) ‘Adam Smith's legacy: His thought in our time’ (1990) ASI (Research) Limited: London. Available 
at http://www.adamsmith.org/sites/default/files/images/uploads/publications/ADAM_SMITH_Legacy.pdf accessed 
on (24 March 2015).  
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Neo-classical theorists further developed an analysis of the market by creating the 
notion of perfect competition which is the equilibrium of a polypolistic market.117  The 
notion of perfect competition essentially assumes a perfect market where each seller 
and consumer sells and purchases small amounts relative to the total amount sold and 
purchased in the market and where all participants are rational, profit maximisers and 
well informed.118 It further assumes that scarce resources are allocated as efficiently as 
possible and products sold in the market are homogeneous, so that customers are 
indifferent as to the supplier from which they purchase the product.119 What clearly 
makes this theory different from the classical theory is that it attempts to analyse the 
effects of competition, rather than a behavioural process.120 The theory has been 
criticised as overly simplified, idealised and often incapable of accommodating the 
nuance and complexity of market behaviour in the real world.121 
 
Besides the economic theories, other authors’ support for free competition is mainly 
driven by their concerns over the challenges of competition regulation.122 For example 
Glaeser and Shleifer arguing against regulation state as follows: 
‘The first, and arguably most important, message of the model is that [there are 
situations in which] the optimal government policy is to do nothing. When the 
administrative capacity of the government is severely limited, and both its judges 
and regulators are vulnerable to pressure and corruption, it might be better to 
accept the existing market failures and externalities than to deal with them 
through either the administrative or the judicial process. For if a country does 
attempt to correct market failures, justice will be subverted, and resources will be 
wasted on subversion without successfully controlling market failures.’123 
 
                                                          
117 Polypolistic market simply means ‘many sellers’; firms have a small market share so that all elements of monopoly 
are absent and the market price of a commodity is beyond the control of individual sellers. See Voigt S & Schmidt A 
‘Making European merger policy more predictable’ (2005) available on 
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.115.897&rep=rep1&type=pdf  accessed on (7 May 2015).  
118 Sutherland & Kemp, Competition Law of South Africa, LexisNexis Butterworths (looseleaf) at 1-11. 
119 Sutherland & Kemp, Competition Law of South Africa, LexisNexis Butterworths (looseleaf) at 1-11.  
120 Strader JM ‘The consequences of neoclassical price theory for US predatory pricing law’ (2012) available at  
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research-paper-series/research-papers/cles-7-2012 accessed on (11 March 2015).  
121 Sutherland & Kemp, Competition Law of South Africa, LexisNexis Butterworths (looseleaf) at 1-22. 
122Ergas H ‘Should developed countries require developing countries to adopt competition laws? Lessons from the 
economic literature’ (2009) European Competition Journal 347.  
123 Glaeser E and Shleifer A, ‘The rise of the regulatory state” (2003) 41(2) Journal of EconomicLiterature 401. 
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Similarly, Ergas argues that by expanding the scope of discretionary intervention in the 
economy, it creates additional opportunities for corruption in countries where endemic 
corruption already stifles and distorts economic growth. 124 He therefore concludes that 
competition law may do more harm than good in the society. 
 
2.4.2 Competition regulation 
Paradoxical as it may sound, those who support for regulation of competition believe in 
the notion that constraints are necessary before freedom can be achieved.125 This is not 
to say that they see no value in free competition, rather they advocate for free and fair 
competition.126    
 
The idea to regulate the market was originally supported by the Harvard school of 
thought in the 20th century.127 According to their theory, it is the market structure which 
determines the conduct of firms and consequently the performance of the market- this 
is known as the structure-conduct-performance paradigm.128 Based on this paradigm 
the Harvard School suggested that high concentration in a specific market is the main, if 
not the only, determinant of barriers to entry.129 Therefore, the aim of competition law 
should be to avoid concentrated markets and high entry barriers.130 This school gives to 
competition law a more interventionist role and places less confidence in the markets.  
 
The Chicago school criticised the Harvard School for its ‘inhospitable’ approach to 
market structures with high levels of supplier or buyer concentration, and its hostile 
attitude towards mergers and non-standard vertical contractual agreements between 
                                                          
124 Ergas H ‘Should developed countries require developing countries to adopt competition laws? Lessons from the 
economic literature’ (2009) European Competition Journal 347. 
125 Brassey M, Campbell J, Legh R, Simkins C, UnterHalter D, Wilson J Competition Law 1 ed (2002) Cape Town: Juta. 
126 Wyman B ‘The justification of fair competition’ (1907) 19 Green Bag 277.  
127 Papadopoulos AS The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (2010)  Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge p. 271.  
128 Weiss ‘The Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm and Antitrust” 27 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1104 
(1979).  
129 Strader JM ‘The consequences of neoclassical price theory for US predatory pricing law’ (2012) available at  
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research-paper-series/research-papers/cles-7-2012   accessed on (11 March 2015). 
130 Strader JM ‘The consequences of neoclassical price theory for US predatory pricing law’ (2012) available at  
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research-paper-series/research-papers/cles-7-2012   accessed on (11 March 2015). 
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firms.131 In the former’s view, competition law should be less interventionist than 
demanded by the structure-conduct-performance paradigm. 
 
The main focus of the Chicago school which they deem as the sole goal of competition 
law is the pursuit of economic efficiency, and accordingly consumer welfare.132 Basing 
their analysis on Neo-Classical Price Theory, they posit that the motive to earn profits 
supercharges competition, ensuring the transitory nature of market imperfections, and 
therefore markets can take care of themselves without heavy regulations.133 Further, 
they urged judicial enforcers to proceed cautiously, lest it mistakenly proscribes 
behaviour that promotes consumer welfare.134  
 
The Post-Chicago School also known as new industrial economics, considers the 
conduct and performance of the market as important in the evaluation of the 
competitiveness of the market.135 By using Game theory, this model challenged the 
Chicago presumption that monopolists have no incentive to engage in anticompetitive 
practices. They argued that the Chicago School gave a too lenient interpretation of 
competition law.136  
 
More recently, the Post-Chicago theory has argued that competition does not 
necessarily prevent or remedy market failure and that firms can therefore take 
advantage of such imperfections to produce inefficient results even in apparently 
competitive markets.137 Like the Chicago school however, it has also expressed more 
faith in the ability of government to identify and remedy anti-competitive practices.  
 
                                                          
131 Qaqaya H and Lipimile G (Ed) ‘The effects of anti-competitive business practices on developing countries and 
their development prospects’ (2008) New York and Geneva: United Nations, available at  
http://unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20082_en.pdf accessed on (12 March 2015).  
132 Hovenkamp ‘Antitrust policy after Chicago’ 84 Michigan LR (1985) 213 at 215. 
133 Strader JM ‘The consequences of neoclassical price theory for US predatory pricing law’ (2012) available at  
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research-paper-series/research-papers/cles-7-2012   accessed on (11 March 2015).  
134 Strader JM ‘The consequences of neoclassical price theory for US predatory pricing law’ (2012) available at  
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research-paper-series/research-papers/cles-7-2012 accessed on (11 March 2015).  
135 Papadopoulos AS The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (2010)  Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge p. 273.  
136 Holland H ‘Transaction Cost Economics: Applications to Competition Policy in South Africa’ available at 
http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/TCE-Conference-Paper-Final.pdf accessed on (12 March, 2015).  
137 Strader JM ‘The consequences of neoclassical price theory for US predatory pricing law’ (2012) available at  
https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/research-paper-series/research-papers/cles-7-2012 accessed on (11 March 2015).  
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2.4.3 Conclusion on theories of competition regulation 
In sum, it is important to note that both proponents for free competition and those for 
competition regulation recognise the importance of competition in the market. In order 
to protect the market from unwarranted anti-competitive behaviour, it is a compelling 
argument that regulation is indeed required.  
 
If the market should be left alone to be driven by individuals’ self interest it may in the 
end produce the undesired result of market distortion. The idea of non-intervention of 
free market in the hope for a self-regulating, self-disciplining and self correcting market 
is indeed ambitious. So too the idea of a perfect market is just as idealistic; it is premised 
on a mathematical precision which is unlikely to be achieved in practice. Therefore, in 
view of the impracticability of a perfect market, competition law is required to remedy 
some of the situations in which the free market system breaks down.  
 
Further, it would be merely cowardice for a country to fear having a competition law 
merely because of its anticipated challenges. 
 
Finally, as seen from the above discussion, the various economic theories that have 
shaped competition law over time have their distinct strengths and weaknesses. In that 
regard, this paper subscribes to Paul Joskow’s assertion that ‘the development of sound 
competition rules and remedies would benefit from integrating these approaches and 
recognising that they are complements rather than substitutes.’138  
 
2.5 Levels of competition regulation   
There are various levels at which cross-border anti-competitive practices can be 
regulated such as; unilateral, bilateral, regional, plurilateral or multilateral level.   
 
2.5.1 Unilateral framework 
Unilateral application of competition laws is based on the approach that nation states 
apply their own national law beyond the borders of their territories; this is referred to as 
extra-territorial application of national law.139 The concept of extraterritoriality has, 
however, always been a highly controversial issue mainly because of issues of 
                                                          
138 Joskow, P.L. (2002) Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules, and Remedies. The Journal of Law, Economics & 
Organisation, 18(1), 95-116. 
139 Piilola A ‘Is there a need for multinational competition rules?’ (1999) 10 Finnish YB Int'l L 263. 
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sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.140 In addition, when left to their own 
devices, national competition policy and law makers will more often than not favour 
domestic producer interests over foreign producer and consumer interests.141  
 
Further challenges of unilateral approach include 'forum-shopping' and circumvention 
of the rules. For example, the applicable jurisdiction is ordinarily where a firm has been 
established. Therefore firms would seek the most beneficial jurisdiction without any 
connection to the actual business conduct of the firms.142 
 
Furthermore, in trans-border cases the uncoordinated application of a variety of 
national competition laws can lead to overlapping or even contradictory decisions.143 As 
a result, businesses incur higher transactions costs since they have to check the 
applicability of a number of legal orders, each with its own scope of application. This 
challenge is even worse in many developing countries which lack the expertise and 
resources to pursue this avenue of relief.144 
 
2.5.2 Bilateral framework 
Bilateral agreements are often concluded between countries, which have similar 
competition policies.145 Such agreements usually provide rules for notifications, 
exchange of information, rules on confidentiality and different consultation 
procedures.146  
 
With Bilateral framework, wariness and the problems of extraterritoriality are replaced 
by mutual trust to a large extent.147 Since co-operation is in the common interest of the 
                                                          
140 Piilola A ‘Is there a need for multinational competition rules?’ (1999) 10 Finnish YB Int'l L 263. 
141 Kearns JE ‘International competition policy and the Gats: A proposal to address market access limitations in the 
distribution services’ (2001) 22 J Int'l L 285 available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss2/2 accessed (12 
October 2014). 
142 Baetge D  ‘Competition law and perspectives for harmonisation’ (2004) 9 Unif  LR 501 
143 Kearns JE ‘International competition policy and the Gats: A proposal to address market access limitations in the 
distribution services’ (2001) 22 J Int'l L 285 available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol22/iss2/2 accessed (12 
October 2014). 
144 Hufbauer G and Kim J ‘International competition policy and the WTO’ (2009) 54 Antitrust Bull 327.  
145 Campbell N and Masse MG ‘The interplay between competition law and Free Trade Agreements - The Canadian 
Experience (2012) 8 Competition L. Int'l 64.  
146 Gal MS and Wassmer IF ‘Regional agreements of developing jurisdictions: Unleashing the potential’ in Competition 
Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries’, (2012) Bakhoum M, Drexl J, Gal M,  Gerber D, Fox E (eds) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920290  (accessed on 24th October, 2014). 
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28 
 
parties, bilateral agreements facilitate the application of their respective competition 
laws. The co-operation also promotes better understanding of the economic conditions 
and theories relevant to the activities of the other party.148 
 
Bilateral co-operation agreements on the other hand, assume pre- existing domestic 
competition laws and have important limitations such as: where a nation does not have 
an effective domestic competition law, where a nation under-enforces its competition 
law, where there are procedural impediments to enforcement of domestic competition 
law, where there are jurisdiction overlaps amongst others.149 
 
A good example of a bilateral agreement is the European Union (EU) and the US 
Government Agreement regarding the application of their competition laws.150 This 
agreement provides an important analysis of the workability and challenges of bilateral 
agreements as it relates to two major ‘players’ in international trade with mature 
competition systems.151 There have been cases where conflicts arose between the EU and 
the US where both competition regulators claim jurisdiction.152 In such circumstances, 
bilateral agreements have revealed a crucial weakness in providing viable solutions to 
cross-border competition issues.   
 
2.5.3 Plurilateral framework 
Plurilateral agreements are broader than regional agreements but narrower than 
multilateral agreements.153 The fewer the countries the more it is comparable to regional 
agreements and the more countries that are involved, the more it is comparable to a 
multilateral agreement.154 An example of a plurilateral agreement is the Government 
Procurement Agreement, which is incorporated into the WTO.155 
 
                                                          
148 Piilola A ‘Is there a need for multinational competition rules?’ (1999) 10 Finnish YB Int'l L 263. 
149 Crampton P & Barutciski M ‘Post privatisation in the America: Competition law policy and the alternative - Trade 
distorting private restraints: A practical agenda for future action’ (1999) 6 Sw JL & Trade Am 3. 
150 The agreement was concluded in 1991 and finally entered into force in 1995 
151 Papadopoulos AS The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (2010)  Cambridge University Press: 
Cambridge p. 64.  
152 Boeing/McDonnell Douglas Case No IV/M.877 and General Electric/Honeywell Case No COMP/M.2220.  
153 Piilola A ‘Is there a need for multinational competition rules?’ (1999) 10 Finnish YB Int'l L 263. 
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2.5.4 Multilateral framework 
There is currently no international competition regulatory framework. However, there 
is a considerable amount of informal cooperation on an international level through 
participation in international bodies. Examples of international bodies include the 
Competition Law and Policy Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD), the OECD Global Forum on Competition, the Working 
Group on Trade and Competition Policy WGTCP at the WTO and the International 
Competition Network (ICN).156  
 
The obvious advantage of a multilateral approach is greater jurisdictional coverage.157 
Nonetheless, the deadlocked discussion at the WTO on multilateral competition 
framework has proved the difficulty in reaching an agreement between a large number 
of players.158  However, this does not mean plans for a multilateral approach should be 
written off, rather it is suggested that a piecemeal approach should be taken in 
developing a multilateral competition framework. For example progress made at a 
regional level may contribute to the further development in multilateral context.  
 
2.5.5 Regional framework 
Regional competition regimes are usually the results of free trade agreements which are 
completed by rules to control private business restrictions in order not to compromise 
the gains of free trade.159 The consensus that has proved to be possible to reach in a 
regional context does not necessarily indicate successful cooperation in a broader 
context.160 Nonetheless, a regional approach gives important practical knowledge when 
analysing the benefits as well as the difficulties in establishing more integrated 
competition laws.161  
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The advantages and disadvantages of developing a regional competition regulatory 
framework will be discussed more thoroughly in chapter four.  
 
For the purposes of this paper, a regional competition regulatory framework means 
supranational competition laws that govern competition in a region. Thus, regional 
rules on cooperation, information sharing or technical assistance alone do not suffice as 
regional competition regulatory framework.  
 
2.6 Competition law in the WTO 
The interaction between international trade and competition law can be traced back to 
the 1940s during the establishment of the International Trade Organisation (ITO).  The 
ITO was the proposed name for an international institution for the regulation of trade. 
Although efforts to form the ITO eventually failed, the successful passing of the ITO 
Charter also known as ‘Havana Charter’ brought into light the link between 
international trade and competition law.162 The ITO Charter, proposed comprehensive 
provisions dealing with restrictive business practices.  These provisions provided for a 
comprehensive control over price-fixing and other forms of anti-competitive law.163  
 
Since the ITO Charter never entered into force, some portions were later adopted in the 
GATT in 1947 and eventually superseded by the WTO in 1994.164 Unfortunately, the 
comprehensive restrictive provisions for the anti-competitive practices of private 
enterprises were not incorporated in the GATT or the current WTO.165 To the contrary, 
the GATT/WTO addresses anti-competitive trade practices by government bodies 
through trade policies such as tariffs, anti-dumping, quotas and technical barriers to 
trade.166   
 
Although comprehensive competition law was not incorporated into the WTO, the 
interaction between trade and competition policy became one of the key issues at the 
                                                          
162Van Grasstek C. The History and Future of the World Trade Organisation (2013) World Trade Organisation: Geneva. 
163Matsushita M ‘Symposium: Cultural conceptions of competition - Competition law and policy in the context of the 
WTO system’ (1995), 44 DePaul Law Review 1097. 
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31 
 
1996 WTO's Singapore Ministerial Conference.167 It was believed that anti-competitive 
practices, private or public, undermined the gains made by the WTO with regard to 
trade liberalisation.168 This Ministerial Conference established the WGTCP to discuss 
beneficial issues raised by the interaction of trade and competition policy.169  
 
During the 2001 WTO Doha Ministerial Conference, the participants recognised that a 
multilateral framework could enhance the contribution of competition policy to 
international trade and development.170 The Doha Declaration provided that 
negotiations would commence after the Fifth Ministerial Conference, subject to a 
decision on modalities of negotiations. In addition, the Declaration authorised the 
WGTCP to clarify: 
‘core principles, including transparency, non-discrimination and 
procedural fairness, and provisions on hardcore cartels; modalities for 
voluntary cooperation; and support for progressive reinforcement of 
competition institutions in developing countries through capacity 
building.’ 171 
 
As mandated by the Doha Declaration, ministers were to decide by explicit consensus 
on the modalities of negotiations on a multilateral framework on competition at Cancun 
in 2003. However, a bargaining impasse among the developed and developing 
members resulted in a failure to reach an agreement.172 Several developing countries 
expressed opposition to the multilateral framework. They argued that such an approach 
would be controversial, if not unhelpful.173  India's representatives stated that, instead of 
developing multilateral rules, the WGTCP should continue to study this issue because it 
                                                          
167 Lee JS ‘Towards a development-oriented multilateral framework on competition Policy’ (2006) 7 San Diego Int'l LJ 
293. 
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169 WTO Competition Policy: Documents - Documents of the Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition 
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is too complex and WTO members were far from agreement.174 Brazil argued that there 
is a need to consider differing levels of development and cultural contexts for these 
regimes, as well as the difference in available resources for this purpose and levels of 
institutional development.175  
 
In July 2004 the General Council of the WTO decided that the interaction between trade 
and competition policy would no longer form part of the Work Programme set out in 
the Doha Ministerial Declaration and therefore, that no work towards negotiations on 
any of these issues will take place within the WTO during the Doha Round.176 
Consequently, there is currently no multilateral system of competition law under the 
WTO.  
 
In the absence of a comprehensive competition regulation, the WTO law nevertheless 
includes some provisions that explicitly address anti-competitive practices by private 
firms, although with minimal force. 177 
 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS) addresses abuse of intellectual property rights, but without specifying abusive 
conduct.178 It also refers to contractual licence control, but again, without describing the 
cases in which these licences could be prosecuted.179 
 
Further, the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) includes rules designed to 
ensure that monopolies and exclusive service suppliers do not nullify or impair 
obligations and commitments under the GATS.180 Without stipulating any legal 
obligation, it also recognises that other anti-competitive business practices of service 
suppliers may restrain competition and thus, trade in services.181  All in all, except for 
some highly specific regulations in the telecommunications sector, WTO competition 
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provisions do not yet include a clear commitment with regard to the prosecution of 
private anti-competitive conduct.182 
 
2.7 Conclusion  
To sum up, it is evident that international trade and competition law are independent of 
each other. However, although there has been much discussion about protecting 
competition on the international trade market, there is little or no progress in the 
development of a multilateral framework at the WTO.  
 
It is suggested that a piecemeal approach to developing a multilateral competition 
framework might be helpful in addressing the current cross-border anti-competitive 
practices. A good avenue to explore in this piecemeal approach is regional competition 
regulation.  
 
In view of the above conceptual and theoretical analysis, this paper proceeds on the 
understanding that competition law is important in restricting anti-competitive trade 
practices. Unfortunately, SADC does not have supranational competition laws. On that 
basis, the following chapter will discuss the challenges of the cooperation model 
adopted by SADC in addressing cross-border anti-competitive trade practices in the 
region.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
CHALLENGES OF THE COOPERATION MODEL IN ADDRESSING CROSS-
BORDER ANTI-COMPETITIVE PRACTICES IN SADC 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The concept of competition law is not entirely alien in the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC). Although comprehensive regional competition laws 
are not in place, firms doing businesses in SADC are faced with a de facto regime 
generated by a patchwork quilt of domestic laws. In addition, there exists a SADC 
Declaration on Regional Cooperation in Competition and Consumer Policies which sets 
out a cooperation framework on competition policy in the region. Hence, before 
addressing the question whether there should be a regional regulatory framework in 
SADC, one first has to analyse whether the challenges of the existing system renders it 
necessary to consider developing a new competition regime.  
 
This chapter discusses the challenges of the cooperation model adopted by SADC in 
addressing cross-border anti-competitive practices in the region. It shall first provide a 
brief overview of SADC in terms of its historical background, objectives, members and 
notification to the WTO. Thereafter, the concepts of cooperation model and anti-
competitive practices will be defined and finally challenges of the cooperation model 
will be discussed.   
 
3.2 A brief of overview of SADC  
SADC is an intergovernmental organisation composed of fifteen Southern African 
states, namely: Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, 
Malawi, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.183  
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The predecessor of SADC was the Southern African Development Co-ordination 
Conference (SADCC), established in 1980 in Lusaka, Zambia.184 SADCC was formed to 
advance the cause of national political liberation in Southern Africa, and to reduce 
dependence particularly on apartheid-era South Africa through effective coordination 
of utilisation of the specific characteristics and strengths of each country and its 
resources.185 
 
SADCC was transformed into SADC on 17 August 1992, with the adoption by the 
founding members of SADCC and newly independent Namibia of the Windhoek 
declaration and treaty establishing SADC.186 The SADC Treaty sets out the main 
objectives of SADC - to achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, 
enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and support 
the socially disadvantaged through regional integration. These objectives are to be 
achieved through increased regional integration, built on democratic principles, and 
equitable and sustainable development.187 
 
The SADC protocol on trade (2005), as amended, envisaged the establishment of a Free 
Trade Area (FTA) in the SADC Region by 2008.188 The FTA was launched in August 
2008.189 Further objectives of the protocol are: to further liberalise intra-regional trade in 
goods and services; ensure efficient production; contribute towards the improvement of 
the climate for domestic, cross-border and foreign investment; and enhance economic 
development, diversification and industrialisation of the region.190 
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http://www.tralac.org/files/2013/06/D13TB012013-Sandrey-Analysis-of-SADC-Free-Trade-Area-20130619-fin.pdf accessed 
on (17 March 2015).   
190 SADC Documents and Publications: Protocol on Trade (1996) available at http://www.sadc.int/documents-
publications/show/Protocol%20on%20Trade%20(1996)  accessed on (17 March 2015). 
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The SADC FTA was notified to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) under General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade article XXIV (7) (a) 1947 (GATT)191 on 2 August 2004.192 
As per art XXIV (8) of GATT, a FTA is understood to mean ‘a group of two or more 
customs territories in which the duties and other restrictive regulations are eliminated 
on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in products originating 
in such territories. Since SADC attained its FTA status in 2008, over 85% of intraregional 
trade amongst the partner states has attained zero duty.193   As a result of the liberalised 
trade, there is a significant amount of cross border business activities and enhanced 
competition in SADC. Mindful of anti-competitive practices that can undermine the 
progress of trade liberalisation, SADC uses the cooperation model to prohibit unfair 
business practices and to promote competition and cooperation in the region.194  
 
3.3 Understanding the concept of Cooperation model 
In its ordinary meaning, cooperation is the act of doing something together or of 
working together towards a shared aim.195 Cooperation in the context of competition 
policy has been defined by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) as ‘collaboration between competition authorities aimed at creating 
synergies as well as partnerships for mutual assistance and reciprocity in enforcing 
their respective competition rules.’196 Additionally, cooperation can also involve 
countries without competition rules, for instance by offering them technical assistance 
so that they develop their own competition laws.197 
 
Cooperation in competition cases can take place in different forms such as the 
following: 
                                                          
191 ‘Any Contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or free trade area, or an interim agreement leading 
to the formation of such a union or area, shall promptly notify the contracting parties and shall make available to 
them such information regarding the proposed union or area as will enable them to make such reports and 
recommendations to contracting parties as they deem appropriate.’  
192Erasmus G ‘Is the SADC trade regime a rules-based system?’ (2011) 1 SA.LJ 17-35.  
193 Sandrey R ‘An analysis of the SADC Free Trade Area’ (2013) Tralac Trade Brief. No. D13TB01/2013. Available at 
http://www.tralac.org/files/2013/06/D13TB012013-Sandrey-Analysis-of-SADC-Free-Trade-Area-20130619-fin.pdf  accessed 
on (17 March 2015).   
194 See The SADC Declaration on Regional Cooperation in Competition and Consumer Policies.  
195Oxford Learners Dictionary  Definition of Cooperation available at 
http://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/definition/english/cooperation accessed on (18 March 2015).  
196UNCTAD Informal cooperation among competition agencies in specific cases (2014) TD/B/C.I/CLP/29 available at 
http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ciclpd29_en.pdf accessed on (18 March 2015).  
197 See Paragraph 2(b)(iii) of the SADC Declaration on Cooperation in Competition and Consumer Policies. 
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(a) Informal cooperation based on the United Nations Set of Multilaterally 
Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business 
Practices (1980) ( the “UN Set” ) - The UN Set is a sole universally applicable 
multilateral competition instrument.  It is however voluntary in nature, uses 
precatory language and provides mere guiding rules and principles. The goal of 
the document is the elimination and control of restrictive business practices that 
have a negative impact on international trade liberalisation, especially within 
developing countries.198    
 
Apart from recommending competition principles and rules,199 the UN Set also 
encourages extensive international cooperation on competition law and policy 
issues.200 It also provides for the formation of an Intergovernmental Group of 
Experts (IGE) that facilitates the implementation of the Set.201 The IGE has no 
judicial or binding powers, but instead provides a forum for consultations and 
exchange of experiences among competition policy experts.202 
 
(b) Informal cooperation based on the 1995 OECD Recommendation on 
Cooperation or other similar soft law instruments with no particular legal 
basis - The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
is an international economic organisation of 34 countries founded in 1961 to 
stimulate economic progress and world trade.203 In 1967 the OECD adopted its 
first Recommendation encouraging its member counties to cooperate in 
enforcement on competition law issues.204 The First Recommendation of 1967 has 
been modified several times, most recently in 1995. 
 
The 1995 revised Recommendation recognises that competition law 
investigations by one country may affect important interests of other OECD 
                                                          
198 Section A of the UN set.  
199 Section E of the UN Set.  
200 Section F of the UN set.  
201 Section G of the UN Set.  
202 Section G of the UN Set.  
203 There’s currently no African members state in OECD. See http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ accessed 
on (8 April 2015)  
204 The OECD Competition: Recommendation concerning International Co-operation on Competition Investigations and 
Proceedings available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/international-coop-competition-2014-recommendation.htm 
accessed on (8 April 2015).  
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member countries.205 Thus, in recognition of the potential cross-border conflict, 
it encourages closer co-operation between member countries in the form of 
notification, exchange of information, co-ordination of action, and consultation 
and conciliation on a fully voluntary basis.206  
 
(c) Cooperation based on waivers - A waiver of confidentiality is consent from an 
immunity/amnesty applicant to waive, within the limits set out in the consent, 
the confidentiality protections afforded to it by the applicable confidentiality 
rules in the jurisdiction of the investigating competition agency. 207 In the 
perspective of the immunity/amnesty applicant, the waiver enables better 
coordination of investigatory measures, expediting the review and decision-
making process, whilst minimising the risks of conflicting outcomes. 
 
(d) Cooperation based on provisions in national law - The provisions in national 
law which facilitate and promote co-operation between agencies or jurisdictions 
fall into two categories. On one hand there are those which directly authorise the 
competition agency to co-operate with the agencies of other jurisdictions such as 
the competition law of Zambia. 208 On the other hand there are those like South 
African competition law which have no such direct effect, but act as a mandate 
for the conclusion of competition-specific co-operation agreements with other 
jurisdictions, pursuant to which co-operation can take place.209 
 
(e) Cooperation based on non-competition-specific agreements and instruments - 
These are treaties which do not specifically concern competition law but may 
have cooperation provisions to address anti-competitive practices between the 
members. For example investment treaties, trade agreements or economic 
                                                          
205 Preamble to the OECD Recommendation concerning International Co-operation on Competition Investigations 
and Proceedings.  
206 The OECD Recommendation concerning International Co-operation on Competition Investigations and 
Proceedings.  
207 International Competition Network Co-operation between Competition Agencies in Cartel Investigations (2007) Report 
to the ICN Annual Conference: Moscow available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc348.pdf accessed on (18 March 2015). 
208 For example section 5(i) of the Zambian Competition and Consumer Protection Act No. 24 of 2010 permits the 
commission to exchange information with other agencies. Further, Section 65 permits the commission to enforce 
competition law at the requests of foreign competition authority belonging to either SADC or COMESA countries.    
209 Section 82(4) of the South African Competition Act 89 of 1998.  
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partnership agreements can have provisions that encourage members to 
cooperate in combating cross-border anti-competitive practices.210  
 
(f) Cooperation based on competition-specific agreements -These are agreements 
that have been entered specifically to encourage cooperation in addressing 
competition law issues. Examples of such agreements include; the 1976 
Germany-United States Antitrust accord, the 1982 Australia-US Antitrust 
Cooperation Agreement, the European Union (EU)-US Cooperation 
Agreements, amongst others.  
 
(g) Regional cooperation instruments- These can be in the form of legally binding 
competition rules such as the 2004 COMESA Competition Regulations or non-
binding principles such as the SADC Declaration on regional cooperation in 
competition and consumer policies   
 
The above forms of cooperation fall into two categories: formal and informal 
cooperation.211 It is worth mentioning at this point that there is no generally agreed 
distinction between formal and informal co-operation but there is a continuum of forms 
of co-operation.212 Be that as it may, this paper distinguishes formal cooperation as that 
which is based on a legally binding instrument such as the EU and COMESA 
competition legal frameworks. In contrast, informal cooperation is unofficial, friendly, 
voluntary and non-binding form of collaboration between competition agencies. Thus, 
SADC applies an informal approach to cooperation.  
 
3.4 Modalities of cooperation in SADC 
The SADC Treaty (1992) does not contain competition provisions. Nonetheless, under 
section 25 of the SADC Trade Protocol, member States are required to adopt 
comprehensive trade development measures within the community which prohibit 
                                                          
210 For example the South Africa-European Union Trade Agreement includes a provision on competition policy. It 
provides for consultative mechanisms to attempt to accommodate the interests of each Party with the application of 
domestic law. 
211 UNCTAD) Informal cooperation among competition agencies in specific cases (2014) TD/B/C.I/CLP/29 available at 
http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ciclpd29_en.pdf accessed on (18 March 2015). 
212 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development  Challenges of International Co-operation in Competition 
Law Enforcement (2014) available at  http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/Challenges-Competition-Internat-Coop-2014.pdf 
accessed on (18 March 2015).  
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unfair trade practices and promote competition. Accordingly, in 2007, a SADC 
ministerial conference directed the secretariat to develop cooperation mechanisms 
between member States in enforcing their competition and consumer protection laws.213 
Member States opted for the soft approach of informal cooperation.  
 
In the same year 2007, SADC set up the Competition and Consumer Policies Committee 
for consultation and cooperation on competition and consumer protection issues.214 The 
committee is a forum that fosters cooperation and dialogue among competition 
authorities aimed at encouraging convergence of laws, analysis and common 
understanding.215  It meets once a year and it is attended by all national competition 
agencies and other competition officials.216 The Committee has due regard to the UN 
Set as a basis for consensus building in international cooperation in competition 
policy.217 
 
In furthering cooperation and to promote competition, SADC signed a Declaration on 
Regional Cooperation in Competition and Consumer Policies (SADC Declaration) in 
September 2009.218 The Declaration was aimed at prohibiting unfair business practices 
in pursuance to Article 25 of the SADC Trade Protocol.219  
 
The SADC Declaration provides a cooperation framework in the implementation of 
member states’ respective laws. The framework includes friendly consultations, 
information sharing and best endeavour clauses. It encourages member states to 
                                                          
213 UNCTAD Modalities and procedures for international cooperation in competition cases involving more than one country 
(2013) TD/B/C.I/CLP/21 available at http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ciclpd21_en.pdf (accessed on 18 
March 2015). 
214 UNCTAD Modalities and procedures for international cooperation in competition cases involving more than one country 
(2013) TD/B/C.I/CLP/21 available at http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ciclpd21_en.pdf (accessed on 18 
March 2015). 
215SADC Competition Policy available at 
file:///C:/Users/Sal/Desktop/CHAPTER%20THREE/Southern%20African%20Development%20Community%20%20%20%20
Competition%20Policy.html accessed on (18 March 2015). 
216 UNCTAD Modalities and procedures for international cooperation in competition cases involving more than one country 
(2013) TD/B/C.I/CLP/21 available at http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ciclpd21_en.pdf (accessed on 18 
March 2015). 
217SADC Competition Policy available at 
file:///C:/Users/Sal/Desktop/CHAPTER%20THREE/Southern%20African%20Development%20Community%20%20%20%20
Competition%20Policy.html accessed on (18 March 2015). 
218 SADC Review of the experience gained in the implementation of the UN Set, including voluntary peer reviews (2010) 
Geneva available at http://unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/tdrbpconf7_s2_SADC.pdf  accessed on (18 March 2015). 
219Preamble to the SADC Declaration on Regional Cooperation in Competition and Consumer Policies. 
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establish a transparent framework that contains appropriate safeguards to protect 
confidential information of the parties, and appropriate national judicial review.220  The 
SADC Secretariat further encourages exchange of technical knowhow that would 
enable SADC countries without competition policies, legislation and institutions to 
develop such.221  
 
A recent development within SADC, which is aimed at enhancing cooperation and 
exchange of case information, is the establishment of an online competition case 
management database launched in 2012.222 Member States agreed that some of the key 
objectives of the database are that the system will: 
 ‘(I) Act as a central repository of information on both on-going and  resolved 
competition cases, especially cases of interest, 
 (II) Promote collaboration and cooperation on cross-border cases, e.g.  making it 
easier to find out if the same parties/cases are being  investigated by different 
authorities, repeat offenders, etc., and  
(III) Provide easy access to case information and best practices in a user       
friendly fashion with search capability.’223 
 
The online database is hosted on the SADC platform and uses the SADC website 
domain: http://www.sadc.int/competitioncases. This is a login and access database for now, 
and is restricted to national competition authorities, the administrator and relevant 
secretariat staff.224 Plans have been proposed to open access to the public after a 
safeguard mechanism on confidentiality of competition cases information is put in 
                                                          
220 Paragraph  1(e) SADC Declaration on Regional Cooperation in Competition and Consumer Policies. 
221 Paragraph 3 SADC Declaration on Regional Cooperation in Competition and Consumer Policies. 
222 UNCTAD Modalities and procedures for international cooperation in competition cases involving more than one country 
(2013) TD/B/C.I/CLP/21 available at http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ciclpd21_en.pdf (accessed on 18 
March 2015). 
223 Africa Competition Forum Newsletter July 2013 available at 
http://www.africancompetitionforum.org/sites/default/files/docs/ACF_First_Newsletter_English_0.pdf accessed on (18 March 
2015). 
224Africa Competition Forum Newsletter July 2013 available at 
http://www.africancompetitionforum.org/sites/default/files/docs/ACF_First_Newsletter_English_0.pdf accessed on (18 March 
2015). 
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place.225 The system is up and running and countries have already started posting case 
information.  
 
3.5 Cross-border  anti-competitive practices affecting SADC  
Competition authorities in SADC are increasingly being faced with the need to enforce 
competition policy domestically and to deal with cross-border anticompetitive 
practices. As will be seen in the below case studies, SADC has experienced anti-
competitive practices such as regional cartels, cross border mergers and acquisitions, 
vertical restraints and abuse of dominant position.   
 
Below is a brief review of the anti-competitive practices faced in SADC, particularly in 
regards to their effect on trade.  
3.5.1 Cartel activity 
A cartel is an agreement, a concerted practice, or a decision by an association of firms 
which substitutes practical cooperation between firms for independent conduct and the 
risks of competition.226 Typically, cartel members agree on:  prices, output levels, 
discounts, credit terms, which customers they will supply, which areas they will 
supply, who should win a contract (bid rigging) amongst others.227  
 
 Competition legislation will usually distinguish between two types of cartel practices  : 
those that are prohibited without determining whether they have produced or may 
produce anti-competitive consequences in the particular situation (per se prohibitions) 
and those that will only be condemned once it has been established on the facts of the 
case that they affect competition negatively (rule of reason prohibitions).228 An 
arrangement consisting of price fixing, market allocation, or collusive tendering is out 
rightly prohibited; these are also known as Hard core cartels.229 
 
                                                          
225Africa Competition Forum Newsletter July 2013 available at 
http://www.africancompetitionforum.org/sites/default/files/docs/ACF_First_Newsletter_English_0.pdf accessed on (18 March 
2015). 
226 Sutherland & Kemp, Competition Law of South Africa, LexisNexis Butterworths (looseleaf) at 5-12. 
227 Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism (2001) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell p.205. 
228 Sutherland & Kemp, Competition Law of South Africa, LexisNexis Butterworths (looseleaf) at 5-57. 
229 Sutherland & Kemp, Competition Law of South Africa, LexisNexis Butterworths (looseleaf) at 5-57. 
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A concerted practice is a co-operative or co-ordinated conduct between firms, achieved 
through direct or indirect contact, that replaces their independent action but which does 
not amount to an agreement.230 For example, in the Dyestuffs Cartel case the European 
Commission fined several producers of dyestuffs which it considered had been guilty of 
price fixing through concerted practices relying upon various pieces of evidence, 
including: the similarity of the rate and timing of price increases, the similarity of 
instructions sent by parent companies to their subsidiaries and the fact that there had 
been informal contact between the firms concerned.231 Conversely, parallel conduct 
cannot be regarded as furnishing proof of concertation, unless concertation constitutes 
the only plausible explanation for such conduct.232 
 
Cross border cartels; cartel arrangements between competitors in the domestic market 
and a foreign country may have adverse effects to consumers and to trade.233 Price-
fixing cartel for example, negatively affects consumers because it enables producers to 
charge higher prices than they would be able to under free market conditions. Further, 
the market-sharing cartel, under which firms seek to divide the market up among 
themselves, can exclude new entrants to that market thereby undermining trade 
liberalisation. 
 
A good example of a global cartel case in SADC is a matter handled by the South 
African Competition Commission involving multiple international airlines. The 
commission referred a complaint to the competition tribunal against South African 
Airways Cargo, British Airways, Air France-KLM, Alitalia Cargo, Cargolux, Singapore 
Airlines, Martinair and Lufthansa.234 The commission alleged that the airlines concluded 
agreements, the effect of which was to fix the rate of fuel surcharges on international 
cargo. The competition tribunal found in part that the respondents were involved in 
discussions and exchanged information by way of calls or emails with their competitors 
and consequently did not act independently in setting fuel surcharge rates.235 The 
                                                          
230 Sutherland & Kemp, Competition Law of South Africa, LexisNexis Butterworths (looseleaf) at 5-30. 
231 In Case 48/69 Imperial Chemical Industries vs. Commission of the European Communities, (Dyestuffs) [1972] ECR 619.  
232  Ahistrom Osakey- tio v. Commission of the European Communities (The Woodpulp Case) (ECJ), 778.  
233A number of competition laws in SADC have been reformed to include prohibition of cartels, see 
http://www.tralac.org/news/article/7106-sadc-aiming-to-protect-local-businesses.html accessed on (20 March 2015).  
234 The Competition Commission vs. South African Airways Cargo, British Airways, Air France-KLM, Alitalia Cargo, 
Cargolux, Singapore Airlines, Martinair and Lufthansa;  CT Case No:41/CR/Apr12; CC Case No.: 2008/Jan3488. (Multiple 
airlines case) 
235 Multiple airlines cases ;  CT Case No:41/CR/Apr12; CC Case No.: 2008/Jan3488. 
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tribunal penalised the respondents and has concluded settlement agreements with 
some of the respondents in the matter.236 
 
3.5.2 Cross-border mergers 
A merger takes place where the business or part of a business conducted by a firm or 
firms is transferred to another firm or firms.237 Mergers and acquisitions can have an 
impact on not only the particular country where the merger is done, but also in the 
national markets of other countries. Usually, national competition laws prohibit any 
merger, acquisition or takeover likely to substantially lessen competition or prevent 
access to a market unless there are other outweighing pro-competitive gains, or if the 
merger would be in the public interest.238 
 
Mergers can be problematic for example, where a foreign corporation acquires a 
domestic enterprise and as a result of the acquisition gains a dominant position in the 
relevant market, enabling it to enjoy a high profit margin, and charge prices well above 
a competitive level.239 Another scenario often encountered in developing and transition 
economies, is where the affiliates of two separate multinational companies have been 
established in competition with one another in a particular market and subsequently, 
the parent companies overseas decide to merge.240 With the affiliates no longer 
independent of one another, competition in a host country may be virtually eliminated 
and the prices of the product increased.  
 
                                                          
236 See Consent Order between The Competition Commission and British Airways (PLC) available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACT/2012/87.pdf accessed on (8 April 2015).  
237 Sutherland & Kemp, Competition Law of South Africa, LexisNexis Butterworths (looseleaf) at 8-4. 
238 In the Rothmans of Pall Mall/ British American Tobacco Merger The Zimbabwe Commission noted that although the 
merger would result in a creation of a monopoly situation in the relevant market (i.e. the manufactured cigarette 
market), it had other public interest benefits provided for in the Competition Act. The said public interest included 
the creation of greater economies of scale resulting in more efficient use of resources, the generation of foreign 
currency through exports, and the stabilisation of product prices on the local market. See UNCTAD 
Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, Geneva, July 03-05, 2002.  
239In the Walmart/Masmart merger the South African Competition Commission found that the merger actually 
resulted in lower prices, this was treated as a compelling public interest and the merger was approved although with 
certain conditions.  
240 For example in the Rothmans of Pall Mall/ British American Tobacco Merger the British American Tobacco Plc of the 
United Kingdom merged with Rothmans International, Compagnie Financiere Richemont AG of Switzerland. The 
merger affected a number of SADC countries as it had the effect of substantially lessening competition in the 
domestic markets.  
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SADC countries have also experienced cross-border mergers of multinational 
companies. For example in the Coca-Cola/Schweppes merger, the Zambian Competition 
Commission (ZCC) found that the merger would substantially lessen competition in the 
national market for the production and wholesale supply of carbonated soft drinks.241 
The merger was however approved with conditions noting that opportunities for Coca-
Cola to engage in anti- competitive practices were available even without the merger. 
Any such breaches would then be dealt with under the ZCC Act sections 7 (1) and (2) 
should any third parties raise concerns.242  
 
3.5.3 Vertical restraints 
Vertical restraints may be defined as ‘agreements or concerted practices entered into 
between two or more undertakings each of which operates, for the purposes of the 
agreement at a different level of the production or distribution chain, and relating to the 
conditions under which the parties may purchase, sell or resell certain goods or 
services.’243 A distinction is made between restrictions that regulate intra-brand 
competition and inter-brand competition.  
 
Intra-brand competition includes resale price maintenance and exclusive distribution 
arrangements.244 Resale price maintenance, or a vertical price arrangement, is concluded 
where a supplier and distributor agree that the distributor will resell the products sold 
to him by the supplier, at a particular price or at a price above or below a minimum or 
maximum determined in their arrangement.245  The minimum resale price maintenance 
is per se prohibited while maximum price maintenance is judged according to a rule of 
reason.246 In an exclusive distribution agreement the supplier agrees to sell his products 
only to one distributor for resale in a particular territory.247 At the same time the 
                                                          
241 AllAfrica Zambia: Coke, Schweppes granted conditional merger available at http://allafrica.com/stories/199912210026.html 
accessed on (9 April 2015).  
242 Comment by Zambian Competition Commission chairman Nicholas Kwendakwema  available at  
AllAfrica Zambia: Coke, Schweppes granted conditional merger available at http://allafrica.com/stories/199912210026.html 
accessed on (9 April 2015). 
243 Papadopoulos AS The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (2010) Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press p. 42.  
244 Sutherland & Kemp, Competition Law of South Africa, LexisNexis Butterworths (looseleaf) p. 6-7. 
245 Sutherland & Kemp, Competition Law of South Africa, LexisNexis Butterworths (looseleaf) p. 6-7. 
246 Sutherland & Kemp, Competition Law of South Africa, LexisNexis Butterworths (looseleaf) p. 6-7. 
247 Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism (2001) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell p. 217. 
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distributor is usually limited in his active selling into other exclusively allocated 
territories.248 
 
Exclusive dealing, output and tying restrictions are the most prominent forms of the 
regulation of inter-brand competition.249 An exclusive dealing restriction is an 
arrangement in terms of which a distributor agrees to purchase its entire requirement of 
a particular product from a particular supplier.250 An exclusive supply contract or 
output restriction is an agreement by a firm to provide its entire output to a particular 
firm or consumer.251 Inter-brand competition also can be restricted by means of tying 
restrictions; this is where a supplier undertakes to sell a particular good or service 
subject to that person also agreeing to take another good of service with it.252  
 
National competition enforcement authorities’ concern with vertical restrictions is their 
potential for raising prices, lowering the quality and quantity of goods, or preventing 
market entry and innovation.253 For example, in the Federal Mogul case, the South 
African Competition Appeal court expressed that; ‘[t]he drafters of the Act clearly 
regarded resale price maintenance as an egregiously anti-competitive activity... .’254 
Accordingly, the appeal court confirmed the tribunal’s penalty in the amount of R3 
million.  
 
3.5.4 Abuse of dominant position 
A business holds a dominant position if it has such a position of strength that it is not 
constrained by competitive pressures.255 Similarly, unlawful monopolisation is a 
conduct through which a firm achieves or maintains a monopoly, primarily by 
                                                          
248 Sutherland & Kemp, Competition Law of South Africa, LexisNexis Butterworths (looseleaf) p. 6-7. 
249 Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism (2001) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell p. 217. 
250 Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism (2001) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell p. 217. 
251 Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism (2001) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell p. 217.  
252 Sutherland & Kemp, Competition Law of South Africa, LexisNexis Butterworths (looseleaf) p. 6-10. 
253 Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism (2001) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell p. 215.  
254 Federal-Mogul Aftermarket Southern Africa (Pty) Limited and The Competition Commission and The Minister of Trade and 
Industry Case No.: 33/Cac/Sep03 at p.8.  
255Sutherland & Kemp, Competition Law of South Africa, LexisNexis Butterworths (looseleaf) Cap 7.  
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excluding other efficient competitors.256 Although the monopoly itself is not prohibited, 
abuse of monopolistic powers is.   
 
If a firm is dominant, its actions must be judged against the conduct prohibited 
under the relevant competition legislation. For example, the following conducts by a 
dominant firm are usually condemned as abuse of dominant position: excessive pricing; 
refusing to give a competitor access to an essential facility; conduct that impedes or 
prevents others from entering or expanding in a market; requiring a supplier or 
customer not to deal with a competitor; refusing to supply scarce goods to a competitor; 
tying; predatory pricing and buying up scarce supply price discrimination.257 In most of 
these cases it is also necessary to prove that the conduct has a negative effect on 
competition.258 Of note, in determining the dominance of a firm in a market, 
competition laws vary in their definition of relevant market, market share, predatory 
conduct and unfair pricing.    
 
Most SADC countries have experienced potential abuses of a dominant position 
especially in the sugar distribution, cement manufacturing and distribution, diamond 
mining and marketing, beef market, wholesale and distribution, and in both clear and 
opaque beers.259 For example in Zimbabwe, Nesbitt Brewery (Pvt) Limited of Chiredzi 
complained to the Competition Commission that National Breweries Limited was 
engaged in predatory pricing.260 Nesbitt Brewery alleged that the National Breweries 
which was in a dominant position had drastically reduced the price of its clear beer in 
Chiredzi to levels that were unprofitable, with the intention of driving Nesbitt Brewery 
out of the market. The Competition commission of Zimbabwe found the alleged 
practices to be predatory and prohibited anti-competitive practice within the terms of 
section 2 of the Zimbabwe Competition Act. Notably, the Commission did not challenge 
                                                          
256 Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism (2001) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell p. 227.  
257 Section 8 of the South African Competition Act 1998.  
258 See Section 9 of the South African Competition Act 1998.   
259 Modalities Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons From Developing Countries (2004) available at 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20041_en.pdf accessed on (22 March 2015).    
260 Clear beer distribution in Chiredzi case, Zimbabwe Commission, Source UNCTAD Intergovernmental Group of 
Experts on Competition Law and Policy, Geneva, July 03-05, 2002.  
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the dominance of the National Breweries of Zimbabwe of the clear beer industry but its 
attempts to drive smaller breweries out of the market.261 
 
3.6 Challenges of the cooperation model in addressing anti-competitive practices 
in SADC 
The SADC cooperation model has experienced several challenges in addressing cross 
border anti-competitive in the region. Whilst general challenges of cooperation model 
are many, the following challenges have been identified as particularly affecting SADC, 
namely: Absence of competition laws in some countries, lack of capacity, lack of 
coordination, different priorities, voluntary nature of cooperation, lack of 
harmonisation of laws and, confidentiality of information. 
 
3.6.1 Absence of competition laws in some countries  
The vast majority of competition authorities within SADC are relatively young agencies 
and some are yet to be established. The competition laws of Zambia, Zimbabwe, South 
Africa and Malawi were the first to be enacted in the region, in the mid/late 1990s.262  
Competition laws of Tanzania and Namibia were enacted in 2003;263 Madagascar in 
2005;264 Mauritius and Swaziland in 2007,265 Seychelles and Botswana in 2009.266 Most of 
the competition agencies were in operation a year or more later after enactment of their 
competition laws. As for Angola, DRC, Lesotho and Mozambique, they are in the 
process of adopting competition laws and policies.267 
 
The research carried out by SADC in its member states revealed that in countries 
without proper competition enforcement mechanisms tended to have market structures 
                                                          
261 Courts have thrown out allegations of anti-competitive practices where there is insufficient evidence that an 
arrangement between the supplier and its distributors has lessened competition in the market. See Competition 
Commission v South African Breweries Limited and Others (129/CAC/Apr14) [2015] ZACAC 1 (2 February 2015).  
262 Zambia Competition and Consumer Protection Act 24 of 2010 (which was initially the Competition and Fair 
Trading Act 18 of 1994); Zimbabwe Competition Act 7 of 1996, as amended; Malawi Competition and Fair Trading 
Act was enacted in 1998; South Africa Act 89 of 1998 was enacted in 1999. 
263 Tanzania Fair Competition Act 8 of 2003 and Namibia Act no. 2 of 2003 respectively.  
264 Competition Law No 2005-020 of 2005 and its implementing decree No 2008-771 of 28 July 2008.  
265Mauritius Competition Act 2007 and  Swaziland Act 8 of 2007 respectively.  
266 Seychelles Fair Competition Act 18 of 2009 and Botswana Competition Act 17 of 2009.  
267 Banc ABC Staying up to date with Local Laws in Africa available on http://www.bancabc.co.mz/news/staying-up-to-date-
with-local-laws-in-africa.aspx accessed on (24 March 2015).  
 
 
 
 
49 
 
that made it easier for infiltration of anti-competitive practices.268 A notable example is 
the 2001 acquisitions by Lafarge of France of major cement companies in Zambia, 
Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Malawi. At that time, only Zambia and Zimbabwe had 
competition laws in place.  
 
Both Zambia and Zimbabwe were aware that Lafarge, the biggest producer of cement 
in the world, could, if not regulated properly, foreclose enterprise development in the 
sector. Lafarge was made to increase production by rehabilitating plant and machinery 
in their respective countries.269 Further, in Zambia, Lafarge had to give undertakings to 
the competition authority that due to capacity constraints; priority for the supply of 
cement shall be the local market before consideration of exports. 270  There was also to be 
an increase of productive capacity within a stipulated time, and that the price of cement 
in Zambia shall not be disadvantaged by the production of cement by other subsidiary 
plants in the region.271  Clearly, the Lafarge takeover of cement plants in Tanzania and 
Malawi could have received a competitive scrutiny if the national competition 
authorities had been operational.272  
 
In the absence of a supranational body, countries whose competition commissions are 
not yet in operation are highly susceptible to cross-border anti-competitive practices.  
Worse still, in the current cooperation framework, assessments of cross-border anti-
competitive practices are done at a national level without much   regard to their impact 
on the regional market.  
 
3.6.2 Lack of capacity and resources 
The introduction of competition laws in some SADC countries has contributed in the 
fight against hardcore cartels, promoting enterprise development in these developing 
countries. However, it can be argued that the cooperation model is too weak to make an 
impact in fighting cross-border cartels at a regional level. This is so because some 
                                                          
268 SADC Review of the experience gained in the implementation of the UN Set, including voluntary peer reviews (2010) 
Geneva available at http://unctad.org/sections/wcmu/docs/tdrbpconf7_s2_SADC.pdf  accessed on (18 March 2015). 
269 See The Takeover of Chilanga Cement by Lafarge of France, Zambia Competition Commission and The takeover of Circle 
Cement by Lafarge of France, Zimbabwe Competition Commission.  
270 The Takeover of Chilanga Cement by Lafarge of France, Zambia Competition Commission.  
271 The Takeover of Chilanga Cement by Lafarge of France, Zambia Competition Commission. 
272 Lafarge of France took over Portland Cement in Malawi and Mbeya Cement in Tanzania.  
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countries in the region lack the capacity and resources to participate in cross-border 
cartel investigations. 
 
Capacity constraints in the region vary between different countries; on one hand there 
is South Africa, Zimbabwe and Zambia whose competition laws are older, more 
experienced and have established case law looking at cross-border issues. On the other 
hand there is Botswana and Swaziland whose competition law is only a recent 
introduction as such they may be less equipped to deal effectively with cross-border 
anti-competitive behaviour. Moreover, the SADC economies are at different levels of 
development; with some countries like South Africa being more financially capable of 
handling international cartels than would small and least developed economies such as 
Lesotho and Malawi. 
 
Further, South Africa has managed to deal effectively with cartel cases, especially after 
the introduction of a leniency programme.273 Other countries such as Zambia that have 
managed to include leniency programmes in their laws are constrained by insufficient 
human and financial resources to fully implement these provisions.274 Besides, multi-
national companies may not even make any effort to apply for leniency in some SADC 
countries because leniency programmes are effective only if cartelists not seeking 
leniency perceive significant punishment to be sufficiently likely.  
 
3.6.3 Different priorities and lack of coordination of competition agencies 
One of the challenges in the cooperation model in SADC is the different priorities of 
competition agencies. The main priority for newer agencies is the building of 
institutional capacity. As such the focus of cooperation extended to newer agencies in 
the region has largely been based on the rendering of capacity-building and technical 
assistance in particular through staff exchanges, study tours and training workshops.275 
As for the more established competition agencies, they are striving to combat cross-
                                                          
273 For example in a recent a cartel case involving Rhodes Food Group (RFG)  and one of its competitors Langeberg & 
Ashton, in the export market for various canned fruit products, a penalty was made only applicable to RFG, given 
that Langeberg & Ashton was granted immunity for its participation in the colluding activities in accordance with 
South African Corporate Leniency Policy. See http://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/6434-anti-competitive-behaviour-in-
export-markets-rhodes-food-group-and-the-south-african-competition-act.html accessed on (9 April 2015).  
274 Modalities Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons From Developing Countries (2004) available at 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20041_en.pdf accessed on (22 March 2015).    
275 See Paragraph 3 of the the SADC Declaration on Cooperation in Competition and Consumer Policies.  
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border anti-competitive practices. The different priorities of competition agencies also 
explain why the competition agencies lack coordination.  
 
SADC has experienced coordination challenges in assessing cross border mergers under 
the current model where each country relies on its own domestic law. The disintegrated 
system produces different and sometimes conflicting remedies by competition agencies 
in the region. For example the Walmart/Massmart merger which affected many, if not 
all SADC countries, was assessed individually by affected countries and not as a region.  
 
In November 2010, US-based Walmart Stores Inc, the world’s largest retailer, made an 
offer to purchase a 51% of Massmart’s ordinary share capital at a total transaction value 
of R16.5 billion.276 This transaction was Walmart’s first cross-border acquisition in 
Africa. At the time of the proposed merger, Massmart employed 27 000 employees in 14 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and operated 288 stores through a variety of wholesale 
and retail formats each focused on high-volume, low-margin and low-cost 
distribution.277 Considering Massmart’s significant presence in Southern Africa, it was 
obvious Walmart’s acquisition of Massmart essentially would have a cross border 
impact on the different affected markets in the SADC region. Regardless of the regional 
impact, each country assessed the impact of the merger for its domestic market without 
regard to the impact on the regional market. 
 
Although there is much contestation about the pros and cons of the Walmart-Massmart 
merger in Africa, this type of multinational, cross-border transaction is inevitable or 
indeed necessary in the face of globalisation.278 Then again, mergers if not properly 
monitored, can sometimes produce market structures which are anti-competitive in the 
sense of making it easier for a group of firms to cartelise a market, or enabling the 
merged entity to act more monopolistic. Therefore, a coordinated competition regime 
for the purpose of assessing regional merger impact and a positive step to developing a 
                                                          
276 Tralac Massmart – Wal-Mart merger (finally) approved (2012) available at  http://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/5256-
massmart-wal-mart-merger-finally-approved.html accessed on (24 March 2015).  
277 Tralac Massmart – Wal-Mart merger (finally) approved (2012) available at  http://www.tralac.org/discussions/article/5256-
massmart-wal-mart-merger-finally-approved.html accessed on (24 March 2015). 
278 Mergers and other forms of acquisition have accounted for more than 80 per cent of direct foreign investment in 
the Southern African states see UNCTAD Modalities Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons From 
Developing Countries (2004) available at http://unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20041_en.pdf accessed on (22 March 2015).   
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regional position on merger control is required to better deal with cross border mergers 
in SADC. 
 
3.6.4 Lack of harmonised laws 
One of the hurdles facing the cooperation model in SADC is the divergence in 
substantive provisions of the national competition laws such as provisions on 
confidential information and legal hindrances to the admissibility of evidence obtained 
through information exchanges.  Competition approaches of each state vary according 
to differences in policy as well as differences in their respective legal systems.  
 
Although various competition laws within the region appear to have similar general 
provisions, there are some significant differences in wording. For example, the Zambian 
Competition and Consumer Protection Act 24 of 2010 stipulates that the Commission is 
authorised to exchange information with other agencies in the performance of its 
functions.279 Namibia and Mauritius have similar provisions in sections 16(1)(b) and 
30(i) of the respective Competition Acts.280  
 
The South African position is somewhat different. Section 82(4) of the South African 
Competition Act 89 of 1998, as amended stipulates that ‘The President may assign the 
Competition Commission any duty of the Republic, in terms of an international 
agreement relating to the purpose of the Act, to exchange information with a similar 
foreign agency.’ From this wording it is subject to interpretation whether South African 
Competition Commission can only exchange information in cases where an 
international agreement to do so is in place.  
 
Differences in how competition authorities in SADC region define confidential 
information in cartel cases can represent an obstacle to effective co-operation. Ideally, 
harmonised laws or better yet a regional regulatory model could possibly resolve this 
challenge.  
 
 
 
                                                          
279 Section 5(i).  
280 Mauritius Competition Act of 2007 and Namibia Act no. 2 of 2003 respectively.  
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3.6.5  Constraints on the exchange of confidential information 
Most countries prohibit their competition agencies from sharing confidential 
information they obtain in the course of an investigation. This prohibition, while 
protecting the rights of the parties, also constrains the degree of cooperation among 
competition agencies. The cooperation challenges facing competition agencies is how to 
promote better understanding of each other’s laws and ensure effective enforcement, 
while protecting legitimate private and public interest.  
 
To overcome the challenge in the exchange of confidential information, competition 
laws could include provisions that allow for extension and exceptions to the duty of 
confidentiality. For example, competition laws could emulate certain provisions as 
those found in South Africa’s Promotion of Access to Information Act 2 of 2000 (PAIA), 
the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-
related Information Act, 2002 (RICA) and Protection of Personal Information 
Act (POPI).  
 
PAIA provides a good balance between the right to privacy and the right to access to 
information. Section 64 of the Act provides for mandatory protection of commercial 
information of third party. However, a confidential record may not be refused in insofar 
as it consists of information about- 
‘ (a) a third party who has consented in terms of section 72 or otherwise in 
writing to its disclosure to the requester concerned;  
(b) the results of any product or environmental testing or other investigation 
supplied by, carried out by or on behalf of a third party and its disclosure would 
reveal a serious public safety or environmental risk.’281 
 
Given the strict treatment of confidential information in national competition laws, it is 
suggested that competitions laws should include provisions that balance the right of 
privacy against other rights, particularly that of access to information and protecting the 
free flow of information.   
 
 
 
                                                          
281 Section 64 (2).  
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3.6.6 Voluntary nature of cooperation 
Finally, mechanisms for cooperation in SADC are weakened by the fact that the SADC 
Declaration is a soft law instrument which does not create legally binding obligations 
for the contracting parties. Therefore, the provisions in the Declaration do not override 
the existing laws of the parties. 
 
The lack of legally binding obligations is reflected in the provision relating to the 
confidentiality clause.  For example the SADC Declaration provides that ‘Cooperation 
shall be enhanced by establishing a transparent framework that contains appropriate 
safeguards to protect the confidential information of the parties and appropriate 
national judicial review.’282 This notwithstanding, the application of the ‘confidentiality 
clause’ to a large extent depends on the provisions of national laws on how confidential 
information should be treated. This means that a SADC country is at liberty not to 
cooperate in sharing information with other member countries.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
To sum up, it is beyond speculation that anti-competitive practices in SADC have an 
adverse effect on trade. The region has experienced cross-border cartels, vertical 
restraints, mergers and abuse of dominant position which restrain regional trade. The 
cross-border anti-competitive practices are on an increase especially with growing 
integration of economies, market liberalisation and globalisation. Commendably, upon 
realisation that competition and consumer protection laws are national but the relevant 
markets can extend beyond national boundaries, SADC saw the need to establish a 
regional competition cooperation framework.  
 
The cooperation model in SADC includes friendly consultations, information sharing, 
best endeavour clauses and an undertaking by the secretariat to offer technical 
assistance to those countries without competition laws to develop such laws. This 
model, unfortunately, has experienced a number of challenges including lack of 
coordination, lack of capacity and weak enforcement mechanisms.   
 
                                                          
282 Paragraph 1(e) of the SADC Declaration on Cooperation in Competition and Consumer Policies.  
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Although cooperation between agencies in the region is undoubtedly important, one 
cannot ignore the challenges of the SADC cooperation framework in addressing cross-
border anti-competitive practices.  
 
As the SADC regional trade becomes more integrated, cross-border anti-competitive 
practices increase and the need for a regional competition law becomes more apparent.   
However, it need not be hastily concluded that SADC should develop a regional 
competition regulatory framework. By weighing the challenges and benefits of 
developing a regional competition regulatory framework, it can help determine 
whether the current system is better than what might otherwise exist. Thus, the 
following chapter discusses the prospective challenges and benefits of developing a 
regional competition regulatory framework in SADC. The discussion will also highlight 
lessons to be learnt from the competition regimes of Common Market of Eastern 
Southern Africa (COMESA) and the European Union (EU).   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
PROSPECTIVE CHALLENGES AND BENEFITS OF DEVELOPING A 
REGIONAL COMPETITION REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN SADC 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In today’s global economy where the adverse effects of anti-competitive practices have 
not discriminated any borders, the importance of competition law cannot be 
underestimated.  Accordingly, it is only reasonable to dispute such assertions as that of 
Paul Godeck that: 
‘Exporting antitrust […] is like giving a silk tie to a starving man. It is 
superfluous; a starving man has much more immediate needs. And if the tie is 
knotted too tightly, he will not be able to eat what little there is available to 
him.’283 
 
Whilst there is sense in warning against arbitrary transplant of competition law, it is 
disputed that competition law is unnecessary in developing countries. As the 2001 
Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz said: ‘Strong competition policy is not just a luxury 
to be enjoyed by rich countries, but a real necessity for those striving to create 
democratic market economies’.284 Therefore, the following discussion is premised on the 
importance of competition law as has been reflected in the Harvard, Chicago and Post-
Chicago Schools. To begin with, this chapter focuses on the prospective benefits and 
challenges of developing a regional competition regulatory framework in SADC. 
Thereafter it discusses the legal implications for developing a regional competition 
regulatory framework and highlights lessons to be learnt from the Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the European Union (EU).  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
283 Godek P., ‘One US Export Eastern Europe Does Not Need’ (1992) 15 Regulation 20. 
284Stiglitz J‘Competing over competition policy’ available at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/competing-
over-competition-policy accessed on (19 April 2015).  
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4.2 Prospective benefits of developing a regional competition regulatory 
framework in SADC 
It is argued that a regional competition regulatory framework holds an important 
potential for overcoming some of the most significant problems that plague competition 
law enforcement in developing countries.285 This is so because small jurisdictions can 
benefit from joint enforcement as well as pooled resources and capabilities. It is further 
argued that a regional regulatory framework can increase transparency; increase 
certainty, predictability and compatibility, broaden enforcement jurisdiction, secure and 
strengthen market integration and create a formal cooperation system.  
 
4.2.1 Joint enforcement, resources and capacity  
From the experience of SADC, small jurisdictions face a number of challenges when it 
comes to enforcement of competition law. Financial constraints for example are one of 
the many reasons that prevent developing countries in SADC from monitoring 
international cartels due to the costs associated with investigations.286 However, 
through collective enforcement and by pooling resources and capacity, it would help 
developing countries to tackle cross-border cartel cases.   
 
Further, although many SADC countries have competition laws, small jurisdictions 
have challenges creating a credible threat to prohibit the conduct of multinational 
companies, given the power asymmetries that exist.287 For example if a multinational 
firm considers the gains from trade within a particular country to be limited, it might 
simply choose to exit the jurisdiction if significant restrictions are imposed. This may 
frustrate consumers who rely on the foreign firms to supply their markets. In such 
instances a developing country may rather decide not to enforce its competition laws. 
However, a regional regulatory framework can create a credible threat by increasing 
leverage through the aggregation of consumers across member states and creating a 
                                                          
285 Gal MS and Wassmer IF ‘Regional agreements of developing jurisdictions: Unleashing the potential’ in Competition 
Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries’, (2012) Bakhoum M, Drexl J, Gal M,  Gerber D, Fox E (eds) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920290  (accessed on 19 April, 2015). 
286 Modalities Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons From Developing Countries (2004) available at 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20041_en.pdf accessed on (19 April 2015).    
287 Gal MS and Wassmer IF ‘Regional agreements of developing jurisdictions: Unleashing the potential’ in Competition 
Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries’, (2012) Bakhoum M, Drexl J, Gal M,  Gerber D, Fox E (eds) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920290  (accessed on 19 April, 2015). 
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critical mass.288 Consequently, multinational firms would feel more compelled to 
comply with the regional law so as to maintain its large number consumers.    
 
Furthermore, a regional body can also help those countries that have less capacity to 
deal with competition law matters. In this regard, COMESA is empowered to deal with 
national competition law issues, if requested by a member state due to its limited 
capacity.289 It should be noted that the EU has also acted in a similar fashion with regard 
to smaller member states such as Luxemburg. 
 
4.2.2 Increased transparency 
Finally, the creation of a new authority- at the regional level- may be an efficient way to 
overcome deep rooted limitations of existing authorities, including corruption, 
inefficiency and bureaucratic obstacles.290 A joint authority might work as a mechanism 
allowing members to create binding commitments of compliance that will be enforced 
beyond the term of the current government that signed the commitments.  
 
It is submitted that for transparency in a regional body to be achieved, members should 
be prepared to enforce the law even if it goes against the interests of strong players in 
the region. In addition, the regional authority must be as independent as possible, free 
from political interference. Further, the institutions need to be sufficiently staffed with 
educated and trained personnel, the leaders and staff should not be corrupt and 
appellate channels should be provided. 291 Furthermore, the decisions and judgements 
of the institutions should be published and accessible to the public.  
 
4.2.3 Increased certainty, predictability and compatibility 
A regional competition regulatory framework would increase legal certainty and 
predictability of decisions. In the current system, where domestic laws are different and 
                                                          
288 Gal MS and Wassmer IF ‘Regional agreements of developing jurisdictions: Unleashing the potential’ in Competition 
Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries’, (2012) Bakhoum M, Drexl J, Gal M,  Gerber D, Fox E (eds) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920290  (accessed on 19 April, 2015). 
289 See Article 7(2) (e) COMESA Competition Regulations.  
290 Gal MS and Wassmer IF ‘Regional agreements of developing jurisdictions: Unleashing the potential’ in Competition 
Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries’, (2012) Bakhoum M, Drexl J, Gal M,  Gerber D, Fox E (eds) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920290  (accessed on 19 April, 2015). 
291 Fox E.M ‘Antitrust, economic development and poverty: The other path’ (1991) Harvard Institute for International 
Development.  
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disintegrated, it brings about uncertainty for example in terms of notification of a 
merger that affects more than one country. Even where all countries affected by a 
merger are notified separately, there are chances of receiving conflicting decisions and 
remedies.  However, if foreign firms were to file one notice to a regional authority in 
cases where a merger substantially affects the regional market, it may be less 
burdensome and therefore incentivise foreign investors to enter and expand in the 
regional market.  
 
Taking a regional perspective in assessing a merger, complemented by a focus on 
specific national concerns, could also benefit SADC countries. If decision-makers ignore 
the impact of their decisions beyond their borders, their decisions might impose 
negative externalities on other jurisdictions.292 For example, SADC has experienced 
cross-border mergers that reduced competition significantly within the region but the 
mergers were assessed (and approved) separately by affected countries.293 The various 
competition agencies imposed certain undertakings to ensure that the mergers do not 
abuse their market power, but this was only in regards to the particular national market 
and not that of the region.294  An integrated merger policy would have been able to limit 
the negative welfare effects of some of these mergers on the region and not just on 
individual countries.295 In general, a regional merger control not only brings legal 
certainty but also allows the region itself to defend its territorial interests in the external 
competition policy arena. 
 
4.2.4 Broaden enforcement jurisdiction 
Ordinarily, competition law is concerned with business practices on the domestic 
market. Therefore most countries only prosecute conduct that causes anti-competitive 
effects in the domestic market. This becomes problematic where the business practices 
                                                          
292 Gal MS and Wassmer IF ‘Regional agreements of developing jurisdictions: Unleashing the potential’ in Competition 
Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries’, (2012) Bakhoum M, Drexl J, Gal M,  Gerber D, Fox E (eds) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920290  (accessed on 19 April, 2015). 
293 For example the Walmart-Masmart merger, Rothmans of Pall Mall/British American Tobacco merger and the 
takeover of cement companies by Lafarge of France.  
294 See undertakings imposed by South Africa in the Walmart-Masmart merger in South Africa Competition Annual 
Report 2012/12 available at http://www.compcom.co.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Competition-Commission-Annual-
Report-web-base-Final.pdf accessed on (24 March 2015). 
295 At the point of merger and acquisition notification, the mandated competition authority is given an opportunity to 
influence the structure of markets through structural undertakings and/or influence behaviour of market players 
through behavioural undertakings aimed at ensuring that a particular player does not abuse its market power vis-à-
vis other players, notably smaller players.  
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in one country have adverse effects on another country. A good example is export 
cartels which by their nature do not really affect the country where the cartelists are 
situated but the importing country.296 Ordinarily, the affected country here does not 
have jurisdiction to address the cartel activity. However, in a regional regulatory 
framework, a regional body would have jurisdiction to preside cases of export cartel; 
that is, if both the importer and exporter are from within the regional bloc.  
 
There are of course, principles of extraterritoriality and comity that mitigate the 
jurisdiction limits of domestic law. Extraterritorial jurisdiction is an international law 
principle where a government has the legal ability to exercise authority beyond its 
normal boundaries.297 In competition law, the extra-territorial application is embodied 
in the effects doctrine which has its origins in the United States anti-trust law.298 The 
European Union also adopted a version of the effects test known as the implementation 
test - jurisdiction may be exercised over any practice that is implemented within the 
EU.299  
 
The position of extra-territorial application in most SADC countries is unclear; probably 
owing to the fairly recent competition laws. In South Africa, however, the American 
Natural Soda Ash cases (ANSAC cases)300 brought into light insightful analysis of extra-
territorial application in regards to the South African Competition Act. The Competition 
Tribunal in that case commented as follows: 
The “effects test” seeks to avoid a juristic lacuna where restrictive practices cross 
borders. We accept the doctrine is open to abuse by states exercising jurisdiction 
when their connection to the conduct is only tangential. This does not mean 
throwing it out. It means limiting it sensibly to avoid the de minimis case. We do 
                                                          
296 An Export cartel is an agreement or arrangement between firms to charge a specified export price and/or to 
divide export markets. See Kennedy K Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism 
(2001) London: Sweet & Maxwell p.208.  
297 Lotus case 
298 The most famous statement of the effects test is Judge Learned Hand’s pronouncement in the Alcoa case:  
‘Any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders which 
the state reprehends’ United States vs. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).  
299 Ahlstrom Osakeyhtid v. Commission (Wood Pulp case) Cases 89/85, 114/85. 116-117/85, 125-129/85. 
300 . See American Natural Soda Ash Corporation and Another v Competition Commission of South Africa (554/2003) [2005] 
ZASCA 42; [2005] 1 CPLR 1 (SCA) ; [2005] 3 All SA 1 (SCA) (13 May 2005). 
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not need now to set that test out, as it is not relevant to the facts of this case as the 
“effects” if proved are not trivial.301 
 
From the string of ANSAC decisions it appears that the South African Competition Act 
has extra-territorial application. Unfortunately, the extra-territoriality comes with a cost. 
As noted by the Tribunal, the ‘effects test’ is prone to abuse by states and therefore 
needs to be limited ‘sensibly’. Sutherland and Kemp suggests that courts should assert 
jurisdiction only if effects are substantial, direct and reasonably foreseeable. Whilst 
limitation of scope may indeed reduce abuse, most countries would not readily cede 
their sovereignty in the absence of an agreement and this creates overlapping and 
sometimes conflicting jurisdictions.302  
 
Similarly, within the context of extra territorial enforcement there is a long established 
principle of comity. Traditional Comity (also referred to as negative comity) refers to 
the general principle that a country should take another country’s important interests 
into account in its own law enforcement in return for their doing the same.303 
Conversely, positive comity involves a request by one country that another country 
undertakes enforcement activities in order to remedy an allegedly anti-competitive 
conduct that is substantially and adversely affecting the interests of the referring 
country.304 Whilst comity does help to avoid conflicts about the application of 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the principle does not provide a legal obligation on 
countries to take interests of other countries into account.   
 
In short, a regional competition law in SADC can help mitigate the jurisdiction limits of 
unilateralism.   
 
 
 
                                                          
301 49/CR/Apr00 and 87/CR/Sep00 Part A.5. 
302 The GE/Honeywell case evidences that different enforcement standards may exist even between advanced 
jurisdictions. The rapprochement of the EU to the US competition law and the bilateral cooperation agreements 
concluded between the two competition authorities reduce the gap between their enforcement standards and help 
avoid conflicts. See General Electric/Honeywell (Case COMP/M2220) [2004] OJ L048/1.  
303 Goyder, D. G., EC Competition Law, Fourth edition, (2003) Oxford: Oxford University Press p.507.  
304 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development  International Cooperation in Competiton Enforcement, 
C/MIN(2014)17.  
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4.2.5 Secure and strengthen market integration 
Regional competition law can function as a tool to secure and strengthen market 
integration. As the European experience demonstrates, joint competition law 
enforcement can play an important role in supporting the creation of an integrated 
market.305 The rationale of competition law in a regional integration is that the reduction 
of entry barriers results in an increased ability of firms to operate in larger areas, 
thereby increasing their ability to enjoy economies of scale and scope, and increasing 
competition.306  
 
A regional competition law also plays a role in ensuring that trade liberalisation with 
the bloc is not hampered by anti-competitive practices by private firms. As a Free Trade 
Area, SADC has eliminated the duties and other restrictive regulations on over 85% of 
its intraregional trade amongst the partner states.307  However, this elimination of trade 
barriers only applies to the conduct of government and public bodies such as the use of 
tariffs and quotas. This means that traders can still be frustrated by the use of restraints 
by private firms which act to prevent goods from entering the distribution channels of 
the home market. Therefore, competition law is used to restrict these trade barriers by 
private firms in that way strengthening the market integration.  
 
Furthermore, it is argued that the proliferation of regional integration may in the future 
lead to as situation where a handful of representatives from these regional blocs 
negotiate at the international level on behalf of the member states. Given the current 
stalemate in the discussion for a multilateral competition framework at the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO), indeed a piecemeal approach is worth exploring. Commendably, 
the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Agreement provides a good avenue for 
the African regional blocs to further integrate their competition laws.308  
                                                          
305 Competition law and policy have been of primary importance in the development of the European Union. This can 
be seen from the inclusion of substantive competition rules since the Treaty establishing the Economic and Steel 
Community (ECSC) to the present Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).   
306 Gal MS and Wassmer IF ‘Regional agreements of developing jurisdictions: Unleashing the potential’ in Competition 
Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries’, (2012) Bakhoum M, Drexl J, Gal M,  Gerber D, Fox E (eds) 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1920290  (accessed on 19 April, 2015). 
307 Sandrey R ‘An analysis of the SADC Free Trade Area’ (2013) Tralac Trade Brief. No. D13TB01/2013. 
Available at http://www.tralac.org/files/2013/06/D13TB012013-Sandrey-Analysis-of-SADC-Free-Trade-Area-20130619-
fin.pdf  accessed on (17 March 2015).   
308 According to the 2011 roadmap, all negotiations should be completed within 36 months. Thereafter, COMESA-
EAC-SADC are expected launch a single FTA by 2016, building on the FTAs that are already in place. Available at 
http://www.comesa-eac-sadc-tripartite.org/  accessed on (16 April 2015). 
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4.2.6 Formal cooperation system  
Through a regional competition law, countries can benefit from a formalised 
cooperation which unlike the informal cooperation places a legal obligation on member 
states to cooperate with each other and with the regional authority.309 For example, the 
above constraints on the exchange of confidential information in the informal 
cooperation demonstrates the limitations to cooperation arising from differences in 
competition laws, differences in procedures, legal regimes, efficiency of the court 
system and the level of mutual trust and understanding. Unlike informal cooperation, a 
formalised cooperation system provides clear obligations for the parties and they also 
provide competition agencies with the capability to exchange important information 
against anti-competitive practices.  
 
Although such formal agreements may contain provisions that oblige the parties to 
exchange confidential information, it is advisable to balance this right access to 
information with the right to privacy of individuals. For example, the information 
exchanged under the provisions of the regional law must be used solely for enforcing 
competition laws.310 
 
4.3 Prospective challenges of developing a regional competition regulatory 
framework in SADC 
Whilst benefits of developing a regional competition regulatory framework in SADC 
are anticipated, it would not do any good to turn a blind eye to the prospective 
challenges of embarking on the legal reform. Southern African countries have their own 
realities and factors that can bring challenges in developing a competition regional 
regulatory framework. Examples of such challenges include: fear of loss of sovereignty, 
lack of political will, overlapping regional integration, lack of respect for the rule of law, 
different levels of economic development and SADC’s poor record in regards to 
implementation of goals.  
 
 
 
                                                          
309 A cooperation provision signifying formal cooperation is seen in the COMESA Competition Regulation under 
Article 2(d).  
310 See Similar provision in the agreement between Denmark, Iceland and Norway on cooperation in competition 
cases art. II, para 1. 
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4.3.1 Fear of loss of sovereignty  
The unwillingness of governments to cede essential elements of sovereignty to regional 
institutions is one of the biggest obstacles to developing a regional competition 
regulatory framework.311 Political leaders and officials often caution against trade 
arrangements overstepping their boundaries.312 Thus, when regional institutions 
endeavour to exercise the powers necessary to ensure respect for community law, some 
governments are reluctant to comply with the rulings of regional courts and tribunals in 
the name of state sovereignty.  
 
It was well articulated in the WTO’s 2004 Sutherland Report that:  
‘Sovereignty is one of the most used and also misused concepts of international 
affairs and international law. The word is often repeated more or less as a 
‘mantra’ without much thought about its true significance.’ 
 
 For example, in an attempt to further national interests, governments are quick to cite 
only one of the meanings of sovereignty which requires respect for territorial integrity 
and the rule that treaties cannot bind a state unless it has given its consent to be 
bound.313 However, the converse is true that: it is an act of sovereignty to become party 
to an international agreement or a member of an international organisation.314 This has 
additional implications: as per the well known international law principle pacta sunt 
servanda,315 agreements are to be kept. States therefore cannot arbitrarily dishonour their 
treaty obligations in the name of state sovereignty. Ceding some sovereign powers in 
international or regional agreements is necessary if at all international law or regional 
integration should exist 
 
Therefore in developing a regional competition regulatory framework in SADC, the 
sovereignty of states will be affected, but that comes with the nature of the enterprise. 
                                                          
311 Erasmus G. ‘Is the SADC trade regime a rules-based system?’ SADC Law Journal (2011) Vol. 1, p17-24 at p. 21.  
312 Erasmus G. ‘Is the SADC trade regime a rules-based system?’ SADC Law Journal (2011) Vol. 1, p17-24 at p. 21. 
313 Articles 7-18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of treaties 1969 contain provisions relating to the expression of 
consent to be bound.  
314 WTO Sutherland Report 
315 The essence of the concept appears in Justinian’s Code: sancimus nemini licere adversus pacta sua venire et 
contrahentem decipere (“we shall not allow anyone to contravene his agreements and thereby disappoint (deceive) his 
contractor”). Code Just. 2.3.29pr (Justinian 531). In the case of a person who agreed not to raise certain defenses, it 
was said that a mere pact (without special form) could create estoppel even without justifying a claim. Medieval 
canon lawyers abandoned the Roman requirements of form, to hold all agreements binding unless illegal or immoral. 
See generally Gordley J, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine (1991) Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
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One way of reducing this obstacle is by jointly enforcing only those cases which 
substantially affect the regional market and leaving others outside the scope of the 
agreement.  
 
4.3.2 Lack of political will 
The successful development of a regional competition regulatory framework in SADC 
requires genuine willingness on the part of the members to participate in the 
implementation of the idea.  This entails that political members are willing to commit 
themselves to obeying the regional competition rules. 
  
Looking at past experiences, there is no political will to enforce the provisions on 
sanctions against members who violate their obligations under the SADC Treaty. For 
example, the Treaty provides for sanctions against members that ‘persistently fail, 
without good reason, to fulfil obligations assumed under this Treaty’, or when they 
‘implement policies which undermine the principles and objectives of SADC.’316 
However, when Zimbabwe failed to comply with the SADC Tribunal’s rulings on its 
human rights violations the Summit was not prepared to act against Zimbabwe; 
instead, it decided to appoint a consultant to investigate the jurisdiction and terms of 
reference of the SADC Tribunal.317  
 
One way of overcoming the absence of political will is by lobbying politicians and 
officials before the regional law is developed. Experience elsewhere has shown that it is 
through the development of the jurisprudence about implementing community law that 
the momentum necessary for effective integration and the protection of trade related 
rights is generated and maintained.318 
 
4.3.3 Overlapping regional integration 
The multiple and concurrent memberships of numerous Regional Economic 
Communities (REC) in Africa are a perfect illustration of what Jagdish Bhagwati 
describes as a Spaghetti bowl.319 This tangle of regional economic integration is likely 
                                                          
316 Article 33(1), SADC Treaty. 
317 See Ndlovu PN ‘Campbell v Republic of Zimbabwe: A moment of truth for the SADC’ SADC Law Journal (2011) 
Vol. 1, p.63-79.  
318 Erasmus G. ‘Is the SADC trade regime a rules-based system?’ SADC Law Journal (2011) Vol. 1, p17-24 at p. 21. 
319 According to Bhagwati, the multiple and simultaneous participation by countries in trade agreements, at different 
levels and of a differentiated nature, and the proliferation of these agreements creates a ‘spaghetti bowl’ effect. See 
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to present a daunting challenge to developing a regional competition regulatory 
framework in SADC.  
 
A glimpse of African overlapping RECs can be seen from the eastern and southern 
countries alone. For example, South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland 
are members of both the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) and the SADC; 
Swaziland is also a member of COMESA. Tanzania is a member of both SADC and the 
Eastern African Community (EAC). Further, of the 15 SADC member states, eight 
countries also belong to the COMESA whose total membership is 19.320 This multiplicity 
of membership can cause confusion, competition, duplication and overlapping 
competition regimes.  
 
Amongst the above RECs, COMESA was the first to develop and implement 
competition law with the COMESA Competition Commission beginning operations in 
early 2013.321  The EAC is another, smaller REC that also has a competition law in place, 
although not yet in operation.322 The EAC Competition Act like the COMESA 
competition rules applies to economic activities and sectors having a cross-border effect 
as between its member states.323 The Act similarly addresses restraints by enterprises, 
abuse of dominance and mergers and acquisitions in more or less the same way as the 
COMESA Regulations do.324 The Act equally establishes the EAC Competition 
Authority which has broad investigative powers, power to prohibit or approve the 
regulated conduct and arrangements and a duty to receive merger notifications and 
approve or disapprove mergers.325 In short, the Act has the same powers and functions 
within its area of operation as the competition commission under the COMESA 
Regulations. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Bhagwati JN ‘US Trade Policy: The Infatuation with FTAs’ (1995) available at http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:15619  
accessed on (20 April 2015).  
320SADC members who are also members of COMESA are:  Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. Whilst Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, 
Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Tanzania are not members of COMESA (Namibia, Tanzania and Angola were 
once members of  COMESA but withdrew membership).  
321 See COMESA Competition Commission available at http://www.comesacompetition.org/ accessed on (20 April 2014).  
322 Kenneth Bagamuhunda, the Director of Customs at the EAC, has indicated that the EAC competition authority 
should be in place by July 2015. See http://www.golegal.co.za/politics/second-regional-competition-authority-begin-
operations-east-africa accessed on (1 April 2015).  
323 See Section 4 of the EAC Competition Act and Article 3 of the COMESA Competition Regulation.  
324 See Part II-IV of the EAC Competition Act and Part 3 and 4 of the COMESA Competition Regulation. 
325 See Section 37 of the EAC Competition Act and Article 6 of the COMESA Competition Regulation.  
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Should SADC develop a regional competition regulatory framework, eight of its 
members will be bound to the competition laws of both SADC and COMESA and 
Tanzania will be bound by both SADC and the EAC competition laws. This can 
possibly result to forum shopping or conflicting decisions for instance where merging 
parties have to notify to more than one regional authority.  
 
Hopefully, the establishment of the tripartite Free Trade Agreement (FTA) arrangement 
between the SADC, the COMESA and the EAC has a potential of addressing the 
challenges emanating from multiple membership.326 However, whilst plans are there to 
synchronise the three RECs, past experience indicates that it is difficult in the short term 
to rationalise the existing schemes.327 In the time being, SADC and COMESA being 
autonomous entities, SADC can still consider developing its own competition law.   
 
4.3.4 Lack of respect for rule of law 
The expression ‘Rule of law’ is multi-faceted. In the present context of regional 
integration, the respect of rule of law means that governments should recognise the 
supremacy of the regional law as well as practice democratic principles.328    
 
To develop a successful regional competition law in SADC, all people including 
government officials should be subject to and accountable to the regional law. The case 
of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd et al. v. Republic of Zimbabwe329 provides a good example of 
government’s disregard of the rule of law within the SADC region. In that case, the 
SADC Tribunal held that the Zimbabwean government violated the organisation's 
treaty by denying access to the courts and engaging in racial discrimination 
against white farmers whose lands had been confiscated under the land reform 
                                                          
326 The Tripartite is an umbrella organization consisting of EAC, COMESA and SADC. The regional integration 
programmes of the Tripartite focus on expanding and integrating trade and include the establishment of Free Trade 
Areas (FTA’s), Custom Unions, Monetary Unions and Common Markets, as well as infrastructure development 
projects in transport, information and communications technology and energy. See http://www.comesa-eac-sadc-
tripartite.org/about/background accessed on (20 April 2015).  
327 SADC expressed the view in the Windhoek Summit Communiqué of August 1992  that SADC and COMESA have 
distinct objectives and mandates and must therefore continue to exist as autonomous but complementary entities. See 
http://www.sadc.int/files/3913/5292/8384/SADC_SUMMIT_COMMUNIQUES_1980-2006.pdf accessed on (1 April 2015).  
328 See Common Wealth of Nations Rule of Law available at http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/commonwealth-in-
action/rule-of-law-2/ accessed on (20 April 2015).  
329  [2008] SADCT 2 (28 November 2008), SADC Tribunal (SADC).  
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program in Zimbabwe.330 Following the judgment, Zimbabwe withdrew from the 
Tribunal and blatantly refused to comply with the judgment arguing that the Tribunal 
did not have the jurisdiction to render a judgment in the case.  
 
The failure of the SADC Tribunal to rally SADC member states against a renegade 
member state (Zimbabwe) has shown that without respect for the rule of law some 
strong member states can flout standing regulations and judgments with impunity and 
without reprimand.331 Without respect of the rule of law, the SADC competition 
regulatory framework will only be a beautiful law without any real legal effect. 
 
The rule of law also closely relates to the practice of democratic principles.332 No matter 
how good the arguments and intentions to integrate may look on paper, the political 
environment for their implementation and preservation must be right for the effort to 
succeed.333 The examples of successful harmonisation drawn from history clearly 
illustrate that they are based primarily upon a common outlook on political affairs 
among the community members.334 As highlighted in the SADC Treaty, the economic 
integration can best be realised with mutual understanding, good neighbourliness and 
meaningful cooperation.335 Unfortunately, one cannot say with confidence that SADC 
has achieved a peaceful and stable political environment. Apart from the Zimbabwean 
human rights violations discussed earlier and the disturbances of peace and democracy 
in Madagascar;336 the recurring xenophobic violence against foreigners in South Africa337 
also goes against the idea of togetherness embedded in the ideology of regional 
integration.  
                                                          
330  Available at http://www.saflii.org/sa/cases/SADCT/2008/2.html accessed on (1 April 2015).  
331 See Ndlovu PN ‘Campbell v Republic of Zimbabwe: A moment of truth for the SADC’ SADC Law Journal (2011) 
Vol. 1, p.63-79. 
332 Common Wealth of Nations Rule of Law available at http://www.commonwealthofnations.org/commonwealth-in-
action/rule-of-law-2/ accessed on (20 April 2015). 
333 Lee M.C The Political Economy of Regionalism in South Africa (2003) Capetown: UCT Press.  
334 The EU, a successful regional organisation, rightfully boasts to have delivered half a century of peace and stability 
see http://europa.eu/about-eu/index_en.htm accessed on (20 April 2015).  
335 Preamble to the SADC Treaty.  
336 Ploch L and Cook N ‘Madagascar’s Political Crisis’ (2012) available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40448.pdf 
accessed on (20 April 2015).  
337 See BBC News South Africa shops looted despite Zuma calls for peace available at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-
32347305 accessed on (20 April 2015) and Times Live ‘With Heads Bowed in Shame’: Thabo Mbeki’s 2008 Xenophobia 
speech available at http://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2015/04/14/with-heads-bowed-in-shame-thabo-mbeki-s-2008-xenophobia-
speech accessed on (5 May 2015).  
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In short, developing a regional competition regulatory framework in SADC will require 
members to take seriously the respect of the rule of law and democratic principles in the 
region.  Political leaders must abide to the law and also take active part in promoting 
peace and stability within their respective countries.  
 
4.3.5 Different levels of economic development  
The SADC region comprises 15 countries at varying levels of development. These range 
from South Africa, which in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) parlance is a 
‘developed’ economy to Angola, DRC, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania and 
Zambia, as least-developed economies, the rest are developing countries. 338 These 
disparities in levels of development can pose as a challenge in developing a regional 
competition regulatory framework as they give rise to conflicting interests and 
priorities.  
 
It cannot be overlooked that one of the key issues that were raised by developing 
countries in opposition to a multilateral competition framework at the 2003 Cancun 
Ministerial Conference was the differing levels of economic development.339 It was 
argued that there is a need to consider differing levels of development and cultural 
contexts for competition regimes, as well as the difference in available resources for this 
purpose and levels of institutional development.340 In particular, it had to be recognized 
that some countries were still in the process of introducing competition laws.  
 
Similarly, some SADC countries are yet to introduce competition laws and there are 
indeed different levels of economic and institutional development. For instance, South 
Africa is the largest economy in the SADC region and has been able to negotiate 
Economic Partnership Agreements with the European Union which is considered to be 
the most successful in dealing with cross-border anticompetitive practices.341 Further, 
                                                          
338 South Africa is in a sui generis position. It is, by way of political affiliation and policy choices, part of the 
developing world. It has recently been invited to join Brazil, Russia, India and China (the BRIC group). In 1995, 
however, it joined the WTO as a developed country. Developing country status in the WTO is based on self selection. 
For least-developed countries, international economic criteria have been adopted and are used in the United Nations 
and other international organisations.  
339 WGTCP Report on the Meeting of 19-20 April, WT/WGTCP/M/8, P 20 (June 10, 1999). 
340 WGTCP Report on the Meeting of 19-20 April, WT/WGTCP/M/8, P 20 (June 10, 1999).  
341 The EU includes elaborate legal provisions for cooperation under Article 11(3), Council Regulation 1/2003. 
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through their bilateral agreement, South Africa and EU undertook to assist each other in 
dealing with cross-border cases. At the moment South Africa compared to other SADC 
members has been vibrant in dealing with international cartels.342For example, the 
South African competition commission has dealt with one of the biggest global cartel 
cases involving multiple international airlines.343 The commission has also exercised its 
extra-territorial jurisdiction and presided over a matter where the cartel agreement was 
made in America.344 Further, the commission has made a number of dawn raids in 
several sectors which are allegedly involved in cartel activities such as: fertiliser, 
bread/wheat, steel, mining-supply, cement, construction, power cables and Bitumen 
cartels. 
 
A look at the considerable progress that South Africa has made in dealing with cross-
border anti-competitive practices, would make one think that it would not be keen to 
join a regional competition law. However, the importance of SADC market to South 
Africa cannot be underestimated.  It has been reported that SADC is South Africa’s 
biggest export market.345  Cross-border anti-competitive practices in the SADC Market 
can also have adverse effect in South Africa. Therefore South Africa has an interest in 
strengthening the competition policy of SADC. The fact that compared to other SADC 
countries it has a well advanced economy and a strong competition law should not be a 
setback to developing a regional competition regulatory framework. In fact, its 
membership in the SADC is an advantage to the region.  
 
4.3.6 Poor record with regard to implementation of goals 
SADC has been criticised for setting high ambitions of integration on paper and 
constantly failing to meet its targets.346  For instance, the region set itself to form a 
customs union by 2010, establish a common market by 2012 and a monetary union by 
2016.347 All these targets are yet to be met. With such poor record of implementation, 
                                                          
342 Modalities Competition, Competitiveness and Development: Lessons From Developing Countries (2004) available at 
http://unctad.org/en/docs/ditcclp20041_en.pdf accessed on (22 March 2015).    
343
 Multiple airlines cases ;  CT Case No:41/CR/Apr12; CC Case No.: 2008/Jan3488.  
344 ANSAC case [2005] 3 All SA 1 (SCA) (13 May 2005). 
345 Saurombe A ‘The role of South Africa in SADC regional integration: the making or braking of the organization’  
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology Vol. 5, Issue 3 (2010) 124. 
346 Saurombe A ‘The role of South Africa in SADC regional integration: the making or braking of the organization’  
Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology Vol. 5, Issue 3 (2010) 124. 
347 McCarthy C ‘The Roadmap towards monetary union in Southern Africa – is the European experience 
commendable and replicable?’ available at http://paulroos.co.za/wp-
content/blogs.dir/12/files/2011/uploads/tralacBordeauxGarnetMcCarthy_20081022.pdf accessed on (20 April 2015).  
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some authors have pessimistically argued that most of the region's endeavours in future 
would most likely end up a dismal failure.348  
 
Whilst it is true that certain targets by SADC are yet to be met, it cannot be said that the 
region is doomed for failure due to missed targets. Therefore, plans to develop a 
regional competition regulatory framework can still be achieved before SADC 
progresses to a monetary union, customs union and/or a common market. After all, the 
existence and effects of anti-competitive practices are being faced in the current SADC 
Free Trade Area.  
 
4.4 Legal implications for developing a regional competition regulatory framework 
The legal implications for developing a regional competition regulatory framework 
vary depending on the legal and institutional design of the regional framework. This 
study identifies two main approaches namely; centralized and decentralized regional 
competition law.  
 
A centralised approach consists of regional law and a centralised authority.349 A 
regional competition law is created by a regional treaty or regulations which include 
comprehensive provisions of competition law and establishes an independent law and a 
distinct regional jurisdictional scope.350 In addition to the regional law, a centralised 
system also has an institutional mechanism at regional level to conduct investigations, 
enforce actions and assess and levy penalties.351  The EU and COMESA are examples of 
a central approach to regional competition law. 
 
Another approach is a decentralised regional approach which consists of a regional law 
but no central authority. Here the independent regional law is expressed by treaty or 
protocol, but the application of the law is left entirely to the member states and 
enforcement is done through intergovernmental cooperation.352 Cases can be brought by 
                                                          
348 Mapuva J & Muyengwa-Mapuva L, ‘The SADC regional bloc: What challenges and prospects for regional 
integration?’  in Law, Democracy and Development  (2014) Volume 18 .  
349 The COMESA Competition Regulations and the COMESA Competition Commission for example form a 
centralised regional system.  
350 See COMESA Competition Regulations. 
351 The COMESA Competition Commission is an example of a regional central authority.  
352 In MERCOSUR regional competition law is enforced by two inter-governmental bodies: the MERCOSUR Trade 
Commission (MTC) which performs adjudicative functions and the Committee for the Defence of Competition 
(MCDC) which consists of representatives of signing countries’ national competition authorities and is responsible 
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the national competition authorities, as they also receive complaints dealing with 
regional law violations.353 The national courts may also receive private complaints for 
violations of regional law. The Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) competition 
protocol is an example of this approach where Member State authorities act together on 
an intergovernmental basis. This approach requires the existence of Member State 
authorities operating under domestic competition laws that have been passed and 
implemented.354 
 
Given the challenges that small jurisdictions face in enforcing competition laws 
independently, a centralised approach is proposed for SADC. A core recommendation 
here is that regional competition laws should be established that includes a distinct 
substantive law for dealing with anticompetitive practices as they affect trade between 
the member states. This law should have the capacity to operate within its own 
jurisdictional scope of application. Further, a supranational body/ central authority 
should be empowered to conduct investigations, enforce actions and assess and levy 
penalties. In that regard, SADC can learn from the experiences of EU and COMESA in 
operating a central regional competition framework.  
 
4.4.1 Lessons from EU competition framework 
The EU355 competition law is arguably today’s most successful regional competition 
law. The appraisal is not unjustified; the EU competition law and policy is consistently 
applied in member states, there is an effective enforcement mechanism and has been 
instrumental in the progression towards a single market in the EU.356 That said, it 
should be noted that the success of the EU competition law is a result of long years of 
experience.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
for the investigation of cases in cooperation with the national authorities of the state in which the defendant is 
domiciled. See Papadopoulos AS The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (2010) Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press p. 178.  
353 According to the MERCOSUR Fortaleza Protocol for the Defence of Competition proceedings are initiated by the 
competition authorities of the member states either ex officio of following complaint by an interested party See 
Article 10 of the Protocol. 
354 Article 32 of the Fortaleza Protocol. 
355 The EU is a regional organisation of 28 countries namely: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Republic of Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK.  
356 Grainne De Burca PC. (ed) The Evololution of EU Law (2011) Oxford: Oxford University Press p. 1-13.  
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The EU competition law can be traced back to the Schuman Declaration of 1950 which 
marked the ‘institutional birth’ of competition policy in the EU.357 The Schuman Plan 
formed the basis of what eventually came to be the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC).358 Since the establishment of the ECSC in 1950, competition law has 
remained the central component of the EU integration.359 From that time to date, EU 
competition law and policy has undergone an extensive evolution.  
In the early years of EU competition policy, legislation secured extra-ordinary powers 
to the Commission. Regulation 17/62 offered the commission the competence to remove 
the authority for the jurisdiction of the member states by initiating its own proceedings. 
Further, the commission had the sole right to apply exemptions for agreements that met 
certain requirements.360 Furthermore, the examination of such cases could be carried out 
by the commission following a notification by the member states of by the member 
states involved in the agreement.361 In practice, the commission was the sole body to 
enforce the competition rules of the EC Treaty.362  
 
These extensive jurisdictional powers of the commission were strengthened in two 
ways. First, according to Regulation 17/62, the commission could issue decisions and 
impose fines which were binding upon firms that were found to have infringed 
competition rules of the Treaty. Secondly, the commission was granted competence to 
issue block exemptions on the basis of Article 101(3) TFEU without approval of the 
Council.  
 
                                                          
357 The Declaration carried the name of the French foreign minister Robert Schuman who proposed a plan for pooling 
the heavy industries of France and her neighbours under a common High Authority. 
358 The ECSC was the first international organisation to be based on the principles of supranationalism which would 
later ultimately lead the way to the founding of the European Union. The ECSC was joined by two other similar 
communities in 1957, the European Economic Community and European Atomic Energy Community, with whom it 
shared its membership and some institutions. In 1967 all its institutions were merged with that of the European 
Economic Community, but it retained its own independent legal personality. In 2002 all the ECSC activities and 
resources were absorbed by the European Community. See Grainne De Burca PC. (ed) The Evololution of EU Law 
(2011) Oxford: Oxford University Press p. 1-13. 
359 The antitrust provisions of the ECSC Treaty served as a basic foundation for the competition provisions of the 1957 
Treaty of Rome. Articles 85 and 86 were broadly analogous to Articles 65 and 66 of the ECSC Treaty. 
360 Article 9(1) of Regulation 17/62. 
361 Articles 2, 3 and 6 of Regulation 17/62.  
362 This model of enforcement is called the ‘authorisation system’ and was borrowed form the German law. The 
model was based on the assumption that all such agreements were considered unlawful until there obtained negative 
clearance from the Commission under Regulation 17/62, art 2. See Papadopoulos AS The International Dimension of EU 
Competition Law and Policy (2010) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press footnote 84, p. 168.   
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The heavily centralised system gradually created a number of problems. The 
commission became overwhelmed with a large number of applications for exemptions 
in the context of Article 101(3).363 Further it was inadequate to meet the requirement of 
vigorous proactive enforcement given that the large amounts of resources were 
dedicated to the examination of agreements.364 The system was also criticised for failing 
to provide companies with legal certainty, as it did not provide a clarification to the 
type of agreements that should be notified to the commission.365 Furthermore, in the 
mid-1990s particular member states expressed their concern about the lack of 
transparency in the commission’s decisions concerning mergers.366  
 
In light of the challenges of the Regulation 17/62, in 1999 the commission published a 
White Paper on the modernisation of the competition enforcement system.367 The public 
debate triggered by the White paper finally led to the adoption of Regulation 1/2003 
replacing the authorisation system with a directly applicable exemption system.368 
Another major change was that national competition authorities and national courts of 
the member states had to apply articles 101 and 102 TFEU when they reviewed cases 
that might have an effect on trade between member states.369  
 
To avoid jurisdiction overlap between the regional authority and National Competition 
Agencies (NCA), Regulation 1/2003 codified the ruling of Masterfoods case370 that NCAs 
are bound by decisions of the commission.371  
 
Whilst a number of experts criticised the extensive powers that were granted to the 
commission, it is argued that such centralisation of enforcement has been the secret 
behind the success of the EU competition system. The extensive jurisprudence gained at 
                                                          
363 Papadopoulos AS The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (2010) Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press p. 169. 
364 Papadopoulos AS The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (2010) Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press p. 170. 
365 Papadopoulos AS The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (2010) Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press p. 170. 
366 Monti G EC Competition Law (2007) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.   
367 Siragusa M’ A Critical review of the White Paper on the Reform of the EC Competition Law Enforcement Rules’ 
(1999) Volume 23, Issue 4 Article 4.  Fordham International Law Journal  
368 Grainne De Burca PC. (ed) The Evololution of EU Law (2011) Oxford: Oxford University Press p. 731.  
369 Grainne De Burca PC. (ed) The Evololution of EU Law (2011) Oxford: Oxford University Press p. 1-13. 
370 Masterfoods Ltd v HB Ice Cream Ltd and HB Ice Cream Ltd v Masterfoods Ltd, trading as 'Mars keland' Case C-344/98.  
371 Regulation 1, Art 16.  
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the regional level was gradually transposed into national legal systems which also 
ultimately led to convergence of national laws.372 It is further observed that the 
decentralisation of enforcement of regional rules only came after years of experience 
and after a considerable convergence of competition laws.  
 
4.4.2 Lessons from COMESA competition framework 
The COMESA Competition Commission became operational in January, 2013. Being at 
an infant stage, the challenges faced so far by the COMESA competition supranational 
regime provide valuable lessons to SADC.  
 
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is the largest regional 
economic organization in Africa, with 19 member states eight of which are also 
members of SADC.373 The COMESA has a free trade area and launched a customs union 
in 2009. The COMESA Treaty includes a number of provisions that regulate anti-
competitive practices. Further, as directed by the Treaty,374 a Regulation on competition 
was published in 2003 containing extensive provisions on anti-competitive business 
practices.375 
 
Two pertinent issues arise from the COMESA competition regime. First, there is a 
jurisdiction overlap between regional and national authorities in competition matters 
which have an effect on the Common Market but are occurring within one member 
state.376  There needs to be a system by which an allocation of cases between the 
Commission and the national competition authorities can be done to avoid 
jurisdictional conflict.  
 
The COMESA and SADC can learn from how the EU has managed to reduce the 
regional-national jurisdiction overlap. For instance it has set up a system of cooperation 
between the European Commission (EC) and the national competition authorities that 
                                                          
372 Papadopoulos AS The International Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy (2010) Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press p. 170. 
373 See Footnote 37.  
374 Article 10(2) COMESA Treaty 
375. COMESA Competition Regulations which were issued in the COMESA Official Gazette Vol. 9 No.2 as Decision 
No. 43 of Notice No 2 of 2004. 
376 Article 3 of the COMESA Regulations provides, inter alia, that the Regulations shall apply to all economic activities 
having an effect within the Common Market. 
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allows for the allocation of cases. Regulation 1/2003 has provisions for allocation of 
cases between the EC and the national authorities.377 The regional-national relationship 
has been further elaborated on by the EC’s Notice on Cooperation within the Network 
of Competition Authorities and facilitated through the formation of a European 
Competition Network, which consists of the national competition authorities and the 
EC.378 
 
The second issue arises from the COMESA merger regulations. A number of issues have 
been raised by legal advisors in regards to the potential challenges that would arise 
from the COMESA merger regulations.379 It has been observed that the potential 
breadth of the merger review rules380 and the lack of any financial thresholds381 could 
result in a huge number of notifications for transactions that have no competitive 
impact in the Common Market. Such an outcome would seriously undermine the 
credibility of the Commission and the merger review regime it oversees. Obviously, 
such a large number of cases would overburden the commission and deplete its much 
needed resources. 
 
Understandably, the COMESA competition regime is still at its infancy and there is still 
room for improvement. Nonetheless, from the experience of COMESA it should be 
learnt that the Commission should focus its resources on transactions that could pose a 
material risk to competition in the Common Market. Further it should be made clear 
that foreign to foreign transactions that have no appreciable impact in the Common 
Market are beyond the scope of the merger review regime and do not require 
notification. 
 
 
                                                          
377 Council Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 Official Journal (OJ) L 1, 04.01.2003, p. 1-25, available at:  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32003R0001:EN:NOT accessed on (19 April 2015) 
378 European Commission, ‘Notice on Cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities’, Official Journal 
(OJ) C101, 27.04.2004, p. 43-53, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/network.html accessed on (19 April, 2015).  
379 See for instance Comments of the ABA Section of Antitrust Law and Section of International Law in response to 
the COMESA Competition Commission’s Request For Comments on the Proposed Draft Guidelines to the COMESA 
Competition Regulations, 2004 (June 2013), available at:  
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/international_law/comments_sal_sil_re_comesa_draft_guidelines_
6_5_2013.authcheckdam.pdf  accessed on (20 April 2015).  
380 Purporting to apply even to foreign to foreign transactions with no nexus to the Common Market 
381 currently set at zero.  
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4.5 Conclusion 
In sum, there is no such thing as ultimate competition laws and practices. The design of 
competition laws varies as the law serves different socio-economic goals. For instance 
when countries decide to converge towards a particular type of competition law, it is 
usually a process primarily driven by a specific competition law agenda which 
naturally reflects their interests. Generally, the core rationale for a regional competition 
law extends to incorporate the detrimental impact of anti-competitive practices on the 
trade liberalization commitments made by the members to achieve free trade. Further, 
the formation of a common integrated market could be the member’s ultimate goal in 
eliminating trade barriers. Apart from reducing cross-border anti-competitive practices, 
there are other benefits that come with a regional competition regulatory framework 
such as: joint enforcement and resources, legal certainty, broader jurisdiction and the 
formal cooperation of a regional competition regulatory framework.  
 
Like most good ideas, there are bound to be certain challenges of implementation. Most 
of the prospective challenges of developing a regional competition regulatory 
framework in SADC such as the fear of loss of sovereignty, lack of political will and lack 
of respect for the rule of law can be overcome if political leaders are serious about their 
commitment to regional integration. However, as for the challenges that come with 
overlapping regional agreements, it is conceded that a SADC competition law will 
contribute to a more complex jurisdiction overlap between COMESA and EAC 
competition laws. Nonetheless, SADC is a separate entity from other regions and it 
currently needs to strengthen its competition policy to protect its regional market. In the 
long run, there are hopes of eradicating this integration overlaps through the EAC-
COMESA-SADC tripartite FTA. Whilst such plans are underway, in the time being 
SADC should consider developing a regional competition law so as to competently 
address cross-border anti-competitive practices in the region.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS   
 
5.1 Conclusion 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has fairly lived up to its status 
as free trade area by eliminating trade barriers on substantially all trade. However, the 
more the tariff walls have been diminished, the more the importance of regional 
competition policy has become apparent. It is clear that trade liberalisation has 
broadened the scope of competition law and policy beyond national borders. Anti-
competitive trade practices are no longer a domestic issue; they have become an 
international as well as regional concern. In view of this transition, national approach to 
competition law and policy is proving insufficient for regulating cross-border anti-
competitive practices.  
 
Like many other regional trade agreements, SADC has experienced anti-competitive 
practices in the form of cartels, vertical restraints, mergers and abuse of dominant 
position which have adverse effects on trade. To counter this problem, the SADC 
Declaration on Regional Cooperation in Competition and Consumer Policies sets out a 
cooperation framework on competition policy in the region. Unfortunately, the 
cooperation model has experienced several challenges due to the absence of or 
inefficient competition laws in some countries. Further challenges of the cooperation 
model included: lack of coordination, lack of harmonised laws, constraints of the 
exchange confidential information and the voluntary and non-binding nature of 
cooperation.  
It is not in dispute that cooperation between agencies in the region is undoubtedly 
important. However the informal cooperation model in SADC is proving too weak to 
competently address cross-border anti-competitive practices. It is proposed that SADC 
should develop a regional competition regulatory framework so as to pool its 
enforcement power, capacity and resources.  A regional law would also benefit the 
region by providing legal certainty, broader jurisdiction and a formal cooperation 
system.   
 
 
 
 
 
79 
 
Whilst benefits of developing a regional competition regulatory framework are 
anticipated, it has been shown that the fear of loss of sovereignty, lack of political will 
and lack of respect for the rule of law can hinder the legal reform. To overcome these 
challenges, it is suggested that political leaders should be lobbied to understand the 
need to protect not only their national interests but also that of the regional market.  
 
The most pressing challenge that is anticipated in developing a regional competition 
law in SADC is the potential confusion that can emanate from the jurisdiction overlap 
with EAC and COMESA.  Optimistically, the establishment of the tripartite free trade 
arrangement between the SADC, COMESA and EAC has a potential of addressing the 
challenges that come with multiple membership and overlapping Regional Economic 
Communities (REC).  However, whilst plans are there to synchronise the three RECs in 
future, SADC currently needs to strengthen its competition policy so as to competently 
address cross-border anti-competitive practices. The modalities of the COMESA-EAC-
SADC Tripartite and whether it will untangle the jurisdiction overlap or simply add 
more spaghetti strands to the bowl is a good research area for the future.  
 
The core recommendation at the present is that SADC should establish a distinct 
substantive law for dealing with anticompetitive practices as they affect trade between 
the member states. In addition, a central authority should be empowered to conduct 
investigations, enforce actions and assess and levy penalties. Importantly, what SADC 
can learn from both the EU and COMESA experiences is that, an overly centralised 
authority and unclear jurisdiction scope of the region can unnecessarily overburden the 
regional authority. Therefore the jurisdiction scope of the regional law should be 
carefully delineated; otherwise overburdening the regional authority can sabotage the 
realisation of a successful regional competition regulatory framework. 
 
5.2 Recommendations  
The following is a summary of recommendations that can be used as strategies to 
develop a successful regional competition regulatory framework in SADC:  
 The inclusion of provisions in national laws recognising the superiority of 
regional laws and allowing for implementation of the regional law.  
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 Lobbying politicians and officials before the regional law is developed so that 
they understand and appreciate the importance of protecting the regional market 
from anti-competitive trade practices.  
 Developing leniency policies at regional level so as to incentivise cartelists to blow 
the whistle on anti-competitive practices that affect the region.  
 Member states could also consider harmonising their competition laws. This can 
take a piecemeal approach. For example members could start off by harmonising 
their merger control provisions, then the provisions on abuse of dominance and 
so on.  
 Regional competition authorities should be sufficiently staffed with educated and 
trained personnel, the leaders and staff should not be corrupt and appellate 
channels should be provided.  
 Decisions and judgements of the institutions should be published and accessible 
to the public. 
 Regional law should clearly define the scope of its jurisdiction, for example 
including a provision that states that the rules only apply to anti-competitive 
practices that substantially affect the regional market and leaving others outside 
the scope of the law.  
 To avoid regional-national jurisdiction overlap there is need for a system of 
cooperation between the regional competition authority and the national 
competition authorities that allows for the allocation of cases. 
 Provisions on exchange of confidential information should balance the right to 
access to information with the right to privacy of individuals. For example, the 
information exchanged under the provisions of the regional law must be used 
solely for enforcing competition laws. 
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